S. Larry Crookston, Randi L. Crookston and Anna W. Drake, trustee of the estate of Spencer Larry Crookston and Randi Lynn Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
S. Larry Crookston, Randi L. Crookston and Anna
W. Drake, trustee of the estate of Spencer Larry
Crookston and Randi Lynn Crookston v. Fire
Insurance Exchange : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
L. Rich Humphreys, M. Douglas Bayly; Christensen, Jensen & Powell; Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Respondents.
Philip R. Fishler; Stephen J. Trayner; Strong & Hanni; Frank A. Roybal; Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation






U T A H S U P * * COUn, 
$800?i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 








Case No. 880034 
Category 14 (b) 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County J State of Utah 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Presiding 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS, #A1582 
M. DOUGLAS BAYLY, #A0251 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
510 Clarfk Learning B u i l d i n g 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
PHILIP R. FISHLER 
STEVEN J. TRAYNER 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
FRANK A. ROYBAL 
422 North Main Street 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant " 0CU-H98B 






IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. ) 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, ] 
Trustee of the estate of ) 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and ) 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, ] 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. ; 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
reciprocal or interinsurance 
exchange, y 
Third-Party Plaintiff, ; 
v. ; 
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H. ) 
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT, ] 
Third-Party Defendants. 





SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah ] 
corporation, 
Fourth-Party Defendant. 
Case No. 880034 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS S. LARRY CROOKSTON 
L. CROOKSTON AND ANNA W. DRAKE, TRUSTEE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
A. Proceedings in the Court Below 1 
I 
B. Statement of Facts 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 16 
ARGUMENT 18 
I. THE JURY'S FINDINGS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD 
AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 18 
A. It Is Uncontested On Appeal That Fire Insurance 
Breached Its Contract And Implied Duty Of Good 
Faith And Fair Dealing 19 
B. The Court Did Not Err In Refusing To Instruct The 
Jury On Comparative Bad Faith 19 
C. There Is Ample Evidence To Support A Finding That 
Fire Insurance Defrauded and Intentionally 
Inflicted Emotional Distress On The Crookstons . . • 22 
1. Fire Insurance Bears the Burden of Demon-
strating that the Crookstons' Evidence Was 
Insufficient to Support the Jury's Verdict 22 
2. Fire Insurance Committed a Fraud on the 
Crookstons 2 3 
a. The facts closely parallel a third party 
insurance situation 2 3 
b. The elements of fraud 25 
c. There is ample evidence to establish all 
elements of fraud 2 6 
d. There is no justification for this 
court's review of jury instruction 
nos. 28 and 29 28 
i 
(1) Fire Insurance was waived its right 
of review 28 
(2) The claimed error in the fraud 
instruction was not prejudicial . . . 29 
(3) Instruction No. 29 states the 
appropriate law 31 
3. Fire Insurance Intentionally Inflicted 
Emotional Distress on the Crookstons 33 
a. The actions of Fire Insurance were extreme 
and outrageous 33 
b. The Crookstons suffered severe emotional 
distress 36 
c. The emotional distress was proximately 
caused by Fire Insurance's conduct . . . . 39 
THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGE AWARD WAS NOT EXCESSIVE 40 
A. The Evidence Of Specific Economic Loss Is 
Uncontested 40 
B, The General Damages Awarded Were Appropriate . . . . 40 
THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD WAS NOT EXCESSIVE IN 
VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE AND NATURE OF FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE'S CONDUCT 4 6 
A. Elements Of Punitive Damages 4 6 
1. Nature of the Wrongdoer's Act 47 
2. The Facts and Circumstances Surrounding 
Defendant's Misconduct 48 
3. The Relative Wealth Of Fire Insurance 49 
4. The Effect of Defendant's Misconduct on the 
Lives of the Victims and Others 49 
5. The Probability of Future Reoccurrence of 
the Misconduct 50 
6. The Relationship Between the Parties 52 
7. The Amount Of Compensatory Damages Awarded . . 53 
ii 
B. The Jury Was Appropriately Cautioned About Awarding 
Punitive Damages 54 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD 54 
A. Fire Insurance Failed To Properly Raise The 
Constitutional Issues Below And The Court 
Should Not Now Consider Such Issues 54 
1. Fire Insurance Never Sought Bifurcation Of 
The Liability And Punitive Damages Issues 55 
2. Fire Insurance Did Not Seek a Higher 
Standard of Evidence at Trial 56 
3. Fire Insurance Did Not Raise Or Obtain A 
Ruling On The Application Of The Excessive Fines 
Clause To This Action or The Constitutional 
Standards For The Award Of Punitive Damages And 
Their Amount 57 
B. The Excessive Fines Clause Of The Eighth Amendment 
Does Not Apply To Civil Proceedings And Punitive 
Damages 60 
C. Fire Insurance Has Not Been Denied Due Process . • . 65 
1. Punitive Damages Are a Necessary Component 
of Civil Law 65 
2. Fire Insurance Failed to Propose an 
Alternative Standard for the Award of Punitive 
Damages 66 
3. The Trial Court Gave the Jury Sufficient 
Instruction 66 
4• Criminal and Civil Penalties Are Complementary 
But Not Interchangeable 68 
5. Any Criminal Change in the Law of Punitive 
Damages Should Be Accomplished Through 
Legislation 72 
THE CR00KST0NS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES 
AND THE AMOUNT AWARDED BY THE COURT WAS BASED 
UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 72 
iii 
A. Attorneys' Fees Are Awardable In Actions For 
Fraud And Bad Faith 72 
B. The Trial Court's Award Was Based On Substantial 
Evidence And Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion . . . . 74 
C. Fire Insurance Has Waived Its Right To Contest The 
Number Of Hours Devoted To The Case 76 
THE CROOKSTONS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY CONTRACTUAL 
LIMITATION 78 
A. Contractual Limitations Do Not Apply To Tort 
Claims 78 
B. The Policy Limitation Does Not Bar The 
Crookstons' Claim Of Bad Faith 78 
1. The Limitation Is Unenforceable As A Matter 
Of Common Law 78 
2. The Policy Provision Is Unenforceable As A 
Matter Of Utah Statute 81 
3. The Crookstons Timely Filed Under Statutory 
Tolling Provisions 82 
a. The Crookstons had until January, 1984 to 
file this action under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-40 (1987) 82 
b. The Crookstons had until June 16, 1983 to 
file this action under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-44 (1987) 83 
FIRE INSURANCE WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY EITHER THE 
DISMISSAL OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK OR THE 
JUDGE'S DENIAL OF FIRE INSURANCE'S MOTION TO 
CONTINUE 84 
A. Fire Insurance Had No Vested Right To Have Rocky 
Mountain State Bank Joined In The Trial Of 
Crookstons' Action Against Fire Insurance 84 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Refusing To Grant 
A Continuance 85 
C. The Crookstons Would Be Seriously Prejudiced 
If This Court Remands On This Issue 8 6 
iv 
VIII. THE COURT'S COMMENT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR . , . . 86 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT . 87 
INDEX TO APPENDIX 
A. The Parties and Witnesses 
B. Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for Separate 
Trials 
C. Fire Insurance Exchange's Memorandum in Support 
D. Proposed Instruction on Punitive Damages 
E. Jury Instruction No. 2 3 
F. Fire Insurance Exchange's Answer to Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint 
G. Fire Insurance Exchange's Response to Trial 
Memorandum 
H. Jury Instruction No. 33 
I. Jury Instruction No. 34 
J. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding 
Reasonable Attorney's Fees 
K. Complaint to Insurance Department dated September 
27, 1982 
L. Fire Insurance Exchange response dated November 2, 
1982 
M. Insurance Department response dated January 10, 
1983 
N. Order Approving Possession 
0. Order denying Fire Insurance's Motion to Lift Stay 
P. Supreme Court Dismissal 
v 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Abel v. Conover. 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960) 61 
Adainson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 
(1947) 25 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 
S.Ct. 1580 (1986) 62 
American States Insurance Co. v. Walker. 26 Utah 2d 161, 
486 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1971) 72 
Ammon v. Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 361 Pa.S. 409, 
522 A.2d 647 (1987) 59 
Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 
101, 103 (Utah 1978) 78 
Asher v. Reliance Insurance Co., 308 F.Supp. 847 
(N.D.Cal. 1970) 77 
Atlantic Richfield v. Nielsen, unpublished opinion, 
Civil No. 473779, Superior.Ct. San Diego County, Calif., 
Appeal No. 003945, Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. (Jl. 6, 
1987, mod. Jl. 31, 1987), cert, denied, U.S. 
108 S.Ct. 2023 (1988) 63 
Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 
(1962) 85 
Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, U.S. 
, 108 S.Ct. 1645 (1988) 62, 63 
Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 
832 (Utah 1984) 54 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 
(Utah 1985) 19, 20, 23, 31, 33, 41, 42, 73, 78-80 
Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 
417 P.2d 761 (1966) 86 
Berqer v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. of St. Paul, 
Minnesota, 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 1988) 33 
vi 
Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 
798 (Utah 1980) 32 
Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York. 53 N.J. 
313, 250 A.2d 580 (1969) 79, 80 
Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) 74, 75 
Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn 
Construction Co.. 515 F.Supp. 64, 108-09 n. 129 (D.S.C. 
1979), affid. mem., 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981) 60, 61 
Cruz v. Montoya. bbO P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) . . . . , .83 
Davis v. Mulholland. 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 
834 (1970) . . . . . 55 
Davis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 545 F.Supp. 
370 (D.Nev. 1982) 77 
DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433 
(Utah 1983) 33 
Diamon v. Penn Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 247 Pa.S. 534, 
372 A.2d 1218 (1977) 79 
Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Bradv Systems. Inc.. 
731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1986) 81 
Domincruez v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 438 So.2d 58 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1983) aff'd 467 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1985) . . . . 35 
Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 
189 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835, 852 
(1987), cert, denied. 108 S.Ct. 2023 (1988) 60 
E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency Inc. v. W.C. Fov 
& Sons. Inc. . 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983) 28 
Elder v. Clawson. 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d no? (1963) 25 
Elkington v. Foust. 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980) 44 
Ewell and Son. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 
188, 493 P.2d 1283, 1288 (1972) 29 
First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards, 
653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) 42, 43, 46 
vii 
Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co.. 89 Cal. 
Rptr. 78, 10 Cal. App. 3d 376 (1970) 35, 36 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 
659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) 54 
Gaaon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
746 P. 2d 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 73 
Goodsel v. Department of Business Regulation. 523 P.2d 
1230, 1232 (Utah 1974) 73 
Green v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.. 667 F.2d 22 
(9th Cir. 1982) 35 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 
2909 (1976) 67 
Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743 (Utah 1982) 24 
Hansen v. Gossett. 590 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1979) 77 
Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co.. 595 P.2d 
863 (Utah 1979) 78 
Holton v. Holton, 121 Utah 451, 243 P.2d 438, 
439 (1952) 28 
Ingraham v. Wrightf 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 
1401 (1977) 60-62 
Johnson v. Rogers. P.2d , 90 Utah Adv. Rptr. 
3, 5 (Utah 1988) 52, 69 
Jones v. Munn. 140 Ariz. 216, 681 P.2d 368, 373 (1984) 86 
Keller v. Keller. 52 Wash.2d 84, 323 P.2d 
231 (1958) 62 
Lanier v. Coastal States Life Insurance Co., 106 Ga. 
App. 802, 128 S.E.2d 550 (1962) 78 
Leone v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 599 F.2d 566 
(3rd Cir. 1979) 79 
McCall v. Kendrick. 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 
962 (1954) 28 
viii 
McCleskv V. Kemp. 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 
1777 (1987) . . . . , 67 
McCloud v. Bauro. 569 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1977) 22 
Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium Co.. 704 P.2d 
573 (Utah 1985) 23 
National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Miller, 
484 So.2d 329 (Miss. 1985) cert, denied 
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 2007 (1988) . 63 
National Security Fire & Casualty Co. v. Boven, 447 So.2d 
133 (Ala. 1983) 35 
O'Gilvie v. International Platex. Inc.. 609 F.Supp. 
817 (D.Kan. 1985), mod. 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 
1987), cert, denied. U.S. , 
108 S.Ct. 2014 (1988) 63 
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n, 
189 Cal.App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835, (1987) 
cert, denied, U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 
2023 (1988) . 63 
Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952) 25 
Palmer v. A.H. Robbins Co.. 684 P.2d 187, 217 
(Colo. 1984) 60 
Park City Utah Court v. Ensign Co.. 586 P.2d 
446 (Utah 1978) 54 
Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n. 6b7 P.2d 
1279 (Utah 1982) 73, 76 
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County. 
555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976) 85 
Pratt v. City Council of City of Riverton. 639 P.2d 
172 (Utah 1981) 54 
Prince v. Peterson. 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 
(Utah 1975) 43 
Ramsey Associates. Inc. v. Coty. 546 A.2d 196 
(Vt. 1988) cert, denied. U.S. , 
108 S.Ct. 2903 (1988) 64 
ix 
Rhoades v. Wright. 622 P.2d 343, 350 (Utah 1980); 
cert, denied. 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 397 (1981) 80, 81 
Saltou v. Dependable Insurance Co.. 394 N.W.2d 629 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 33 
Schmidt v. American Leasco. 139 Ariz. 509, 679 P.2d 
532, 535 (1983) 66 
Schwartz v. Tanner. 576 P.2d 873 (Utah 1978) 24 
Sears v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982) 73 
Sharp v. Hui Wahine. Inc.. 49 Haw. 241, 413 P.2d 
242 (1966) 73, 74, 76 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 464 U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 
(1984) 69 
Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of America. 731 P.2d 1267 
(Idaho 1986) cert, denied. U.S. , 
108 S.Ct. 2013, (1988) 64 
Smith V. Wade. 461 U.S. 30, 50, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (1983) 67 
Snyderville Transportation Co. Inc. v. Christiansen. 
609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980) 20 
State Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 
P.2d 998 (Utah 1982) 81 
Stephens v. Henderson. 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987) 20 
Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) 53 
Toepleman v. United States. 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959) . . . . 61 
Treadwell Ford. Inc. v. Campbell. 485 So.2d 312 
(Ala. 1986) cert, denied. U.S. , 
108 S.Ct. 2007 (1988) 64 
Turtle Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management. Inc., 
645 P. 2d 667 (Utah 1982) 58 
Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 
6 Kan.2d 346, 629 P.2d 196, 206 (1981) 60 
United States v. United Mine Workers of America. 330 U.S. 
258, 304-05, 67 S.Ct. 677, 702 (1947) 69 
X 
United States v. Stanqland, 242 F.2d 843, 848 
(7th Cir. 1957) 60 
Valdez v. Cillessen & Son. Inc.. 105 N.M. 575, 734 
P.2d 1258 (1987) 66 
VanDvke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distributorsr Inc., 
758 P. 2d 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 53 
Wagner v. Olsen. 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 
702 (1971) 28, 54 
Wilson v. Oldrovd. 1 Utah 362, 267 P.2d 759, 
764 (1954) 45 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519, 88 
S.Ct. 1770, 1775 (1968) 67 
Zions First National Bank v. National American Title 
Insurance Co. . 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988) 73, 80 
Zwick v. Freeman. 373 F.2d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1967) 
cert, denied. 389 U.S. 835, 88 S.Ct. 43 (1967) 61 
Rules and Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1602 68 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-308(10), (11), and (12) 
effective through December 31, 1987 Utah Code 
Ann. (1988 Supp.) 69 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-1(1), (1988) 85 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8(1) (1974) 33 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-19 (1953) [repealed] 80 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1986) 80 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301 (1986) 69 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (1988 Supp.) 68, 69 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-919 (1) (b) (as amended) 69 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603.5(5) (1988 Supp.) 68 
xi 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303 (as amended) 68 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1988) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1987) 81, 82 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1987) 83 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 through 43 (1987) 20 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 51 28 
Other Authorities 
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, 
377-78 (1768) 68 
Devitt, Blackmar and Wolff, Federal Jury Practice 
and Instructions, 4th Ed. § 83.02 (1987) 29 
Johnston, "Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency 
in Tort Law," 87 Col.L.Rev. 1385, 1387 n. 8 (1987) 71 
Mailer & Roberts, "Punitive Damages: Toward a 
Principled Approach," 31 Hast L.J. 639, 643-650 (1980) . . . . 65 
Prentice, "Reforming Punitive Damages: The Judicial 
Bargaining Concept," 7 Rev. Litigation, 113, 123 (1988) . . . 71 
Prosser, "Insult and Outrage," 44 Cal. L. Rev. 40, 
53 (1956) 44 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) 34, 38 
xii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1988) provides 
jurisdiction for an appeal from a civil judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Proceedings in the Court Below 
The Crookstons commenced this action against Fire Insur-
ance and Rocky Mountain State Bank seeking damages. Fire Insurance 
thereafter joined third-party defendants Jimmy Jones, Kyle 
Brewster, and Bert Berrett. Brewster and Berrett in turn filed 
claims against Syro Steel. 
Fire Insurance later filed a separate subrogation action 
in the Crookstons' name against Jones, Brewster, and Berrett in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No. C-84-
7061. Upon motion by defendant Jones, the trial court consolidated 
the separate action with the third-party complaints which Fire 
Insurance had previously filed in the present action. 
Ultimately Judge Frederick bifurcated the trials of the 
Crookstons7 actions against Fire Insurance and the Bank (adjudi-
cating liabilities for an insurance settlement) from Fire Insur-
ance's subrogation action against Jones, Brewster, and Berrett 
(adjudicating responsibility for the collapse of the Crookstons7 
home). Just before trial in the insurance action, the Crookstons 
settled their claims against the Bank. On the morning of trial, 
the trial court dismissed Fire Insurance's cross-claims against the 
Bank pursuant to a motion for summary judgment. (R. 1541-42) 
1 
The trial of the Crookstons' claim against Fire Insurance 
commenced on May 26, 1987 and ended on June 4, 1987. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the jury rendered its verdict against Fire 
Insurance in the amount of $815,826.00 for compensatory damages and 
$4,000,000.00 for exemplary damages. Accordingly, the trial court 
entered a judgment in the amount of $4,815,826,> 00 on June 11, 1987. 
(R. 1543-45) Based on the jury's findings, Judge Frederick ruled 
that the Crookstons were entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
After a hearing, the trial court awarded attorney's fees and costs 
and thereafter entered an additional judgment totaling $190,316.32. 
(R. 2973) Fire Insurance filed motions for a new trial, judgment 
n.o.v., and remittitur which the trial court denied. (R. 2959, 60) 
Fire Insurance thereafter settled the subrogation claims 
against Berrett and Jones and took default judgment against 
Brewster. The fourth party claims against Syro Steel were also 
settled. 
B. Statement of Facts 
This case involves the failure of Fire Insurance Ex-
change, a member of the Farmers Insurance Group, to timely and 
properly adjust and settle a casualty loss to the Crookstons' home. 
Through a series of misrepresentations and concealments, Fire 
Insurance perpetrated a fraud on the Crookstons and on Rocky 
Mountain State Bank ("the Bank"), holder of a first deed of trust 
on the Crookstons' home and loss payee under the Fire Insurance 
policy. By means of a fraudulent and inadequate settlement with 
2 
the Bank, Fire Insurance obtained a release and satisfaction of the 
Bank's claim on the policy. The Bank then proceeded to foreclos-
ure. As a result, the Crookstons lost their home and were forced 
into bankruptcy. The Crookstons filed suit against Fire Insurance, 
resulting in a judgment, from which Fire Insurance now appeals. 
Fire Insurance's statement of the facts quite naturally 
recites the facts in a manner highly favorable to its position. 
Respondents therefore provide a complete statement of the facts.1 
1. Mr. and Mrs. Crookston were married in 1973. Mr. 
Crookston continually worked two to three jobs and saved for many 
years until 1978, when the Crookstons paid cash for a vacant lot in 
Bountiful, Utah. (R. 2000-1) They continued to work and save 
their money in anticipation of building their home on the unencum-
bered lot. 
2. In December 1980, the Crookstons obtained a con-
struction loan from the Bank in the amount of $60,000 and in the 
early part of 1981, began construction. (R. 2006) During the 
course of construction, the Crookstons personally paid approximate-
ly $5,000 toward construction costs and paid the Bank $12,000 to 
reduce the construction loan. (R. 2009; Ex's. 2, 5) The 
Crookstons also performed various services such as painting and 
finish work in order to keep costs down. (R. 2019-20, 2160) On 
xFor the Court's convenience, Appendix A attached hereto is a 
descriptive outline of the witnesses and parties to show how they 
interrelate to one another. 
3 
December 2, 1981, the roof of the Crookstons' home collapsed, 
causing extensive damage. 
3. Kyle Brewster, the contractor who was building the 
Crookstons' home, had approximately 40 years of contracting and 
estimating experience. (R. 2150) He testified that just prior to 
the time of the collapse, the home was approximately two-thirds 
completed and had the collapse not occurred, the home could have 
been completed within budget during the next four to five weeks. 
(R. 2159-60, 2181) Besides the structure, scaffolding, other 
equipment and unused building materials were also destroyed in the 
collapse. (R. 2161-62, 2114) 
4. The Crookstons gave prompt notice to their insurer, 
Fire Insurance, who assigned Denton Moser to investigate and adjust 
the loss. Other than taking pictures, Moser did very little to 
determine the scope of the damage and evaluate the loss. (Ex. 11, 
12) Fire Insurance did not contest coverage and admitted that the 
cause of the collapse was irrelevant to the Crookstons' claim. (R. 
1889-90, 2236) In mid-December, 1981, Fire Insurance retained Kent 
Rich, an engineer, to determine the cause of the collapse for 
purposes of protecting and enabling Fire Insurance to pursue a 
subrogation claim. Fire Insurance did not request Mr. Rich to 
ascertain the scope of the damage or evaluate the loss for adjust-
ing purposes. (R. 2655-57, 1926; Ex. 41, p. 3-4) 
5. Within a few weeks after the collapse, the 
Crookstons retained attorney Ralph Klemm because they were con-
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cerned that Fire Insurance was not doing anything to adjust the 
loss. In their first communication, Moser asked Klemm to assist 
him in obtaining a bid to have the home repaired. (R. 1686-87) 
Mr. Klemm obtained an estimate from Rex Stallings, an experienced 
contractor of 36 years. (R. 2097) The Crookstons and Moser also 
sought an estimate from Brewster. (R. 2403-4) 
6. By the end of March, 1982, Moser had the bids of two 
contractors: (1) Brewster in the amount of $50,951, and (2) Rex 
Stallings in the amount of $49,600. (Ex. 38, p. 2; Ex. 40; R. 1693-
94) Based upon these bids, Moser submitted an internal request for 
$50,000 settlement authority to the Pocatello regional office. (R. 
1977). On April 15, the regional office extended settlement 
authority in the amount of $49,443.00. (Ex. 13, p.2) In May, Moser 
obtained a bid from Jimmy Jones, an architect, in the amount of 
$74,000 (Ex. 11, p. 101), but ignored it without inquiry. (Ex. 11, 
p.101; R. 1992) 
7. Rather than offering anything to settle the claim, 
Fire Insurance requested Rich, the engineer, to perform an analysis 
of the observable structural damage. (R. 2654-56, 2663) On May 
25, Rich prepared a report outlining some of the structural damage 
that had to be addressed. (Ex. 41, p.l) Fire Insurance never 
requested Mr. Rich to evaluate all of the damage, nor did it ever 
inform Rich that his report would be the basis for a bid to 
reconstruct the house. (R. 2656) Rich testified that, "The 
approach that I took in making that investigation was not such that 
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my report could be used as a bid list for bidding the repair of or 
of repairing the total structure." (Re 2654) He then described how 
the sheetrock covered most of the walls and there was no way to 
determine the extent of the damages to the studs, joists, and the 
plumbing, electrical and heating systems. (R. 2659, 2661-62) 
8. During May, 1982, Fire Insurance replaced Moser with 
a more experienced adjuster, Alan Clapperton. Even though Clapper-
ton had no basis to doubt the validity of the prior three bids (R. 
2242-43), he totally disregarded them without notice to or discus-
sion with the Crookstons, their attorney, or the Bank. (R. 1694, 
1699, 2015-16) 
9. Knowing that Mr. Rich's report was limited in scope, 
Clapperton took the report to Steven Phipps, a licensed contractor 
of only three years. (R. 2592) Moser, the previous adjuster, had 
contacted Phipps in February about possibly preparing a bid but did 
not pursue it due to Phipps' lack of experience. (R. 1993, 2584) 
When Clapperton contacted Phipps, Clapperton gave Phipps the Rich 
report, represented that the report covered all of the damage, and 
asked Phipps to prepare a bid based thereon. (R. 2246) Phipps 
knew from prior experience that if he was required to rebuild the 
Crookston home, he could submit supplemental bids and be paid for 
additional work and materials not described in his original bid. 
(R. 2610-11) Phipps then prepared a bid in the amount of 
$27,830.60 and delivered it to Clapperton on June 14, 1982. (Ex. 
11, pp. 109-115; R. 2247) Knowing that his bid would not cover all 
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repairs, Phipps expressly qualified his bid, stating "This bid is 
to do only the items listed here and outlined by the engineer Kent 
Rich." (Ex. 11, p. 114) Phipps did not believe he would be asked 
to actually rebuild the home but nonetheless qualified his bid to 
ensure that if he were ever requested to rebuild he could supple-
ment his bid for additional items. (R. 2605, 2621) 
10. Mr. Phipps is the son-in-law of a Farmers Insurance 
agent and was doing a substantial amount of insurance repair work 
for Fire Insurance through his father-in-law's referrals. (R. 2618-
19, 2593-94) Phipps7 credibility was seriously questioned, not 
only because of his bias, but because his bid was wholly inade-
quate and disproportionate to the other bids. Phipps admitted at 
trial that his bid omitted numerous items that should have been 
included, such as the broken cement driveway (R. 2114, 2632-33), 
the cost of engineer services (R. 2626) ; numerous building supplies 
and material that were destroyed (R. 2634); a large crack in a 
foundation wall (Ex. 42, pp. 26-29, R. 2633); the damage to 
electrical, plumbing and heating systems (R. 2634-42); sandblasting 
the interior wall (R. 2634-36); paint, stain and labor relating 
thereto (R. 2637); waterproofing the outer shell (R. 2638-40); 
additional interest on the construction loan during the rebuilding 
phase (R. 2644); and numerous other items (R. 2642-43). Phipps 
admitted on cross-examination that his bid was incomplete and that 
any representation that his bid would be sufficient to rebuild the 
home would be untrue. (R. 2646-48, 2651-53) 
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11. The Phipps bid was based upon salvaging and reusing 
most of the interior walls and floors, even though he did not know 
whether they could be salvaged. (R. 2627-29) It was clear from the 
evidence that such salvage was impossible. A disinterested 
witness, Argen Jager, a contractor of 50 years experience who 
bought the collapsed house from the Bank (R. 2665-66), testified 
that when he rebuilt the house, he had to completely tear out the 
interior due to the extensive damage and was able to salvage very 
little of the original building materials. (R. 2666-67) 
12. Clapperton received the qualified Phipps bid on June 
14, 1982. (R. 2247) Knowing that the bid was inadequate and did 
not include all of the amounts owing under the policy (R. 2248-52, 
2320-21; Ex. 11, p. 114), he immediately called the Bank to arrange 
a settlement meeting on June 16. (R. 2253-54, 2035) 
13. Since March, 1982, Mr. Klemm and the Bank had 
telephoned Fire Insurance on a regular basis inquiring about 
settlement. Fire Insurance continually told them that the adjust-
ers were working on a settlement, and that they would shortly get 
back to them with an offer. (R. 1697-1700, 2033-34) The Bank had 
even tried to find a contractor to bid the repairs, but was 
unsuccessful. (R. 2035) As early as April, Mr. Klemm had made a 
demand for $50,000. (R. 1695-96) Clapperton therefore knew that 
Mr. Klemm would resist any settlement based upon the Phipps bid. 
14. On June 16, 1982, Mr. Klemm contacted Clapperton, 
expressing concern over the delay and again requesting the status 
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(R. 2037) Mr, Murdock, the Bank officer, had had only one or two 
experiences involving loss payee coverage. (R. 2032) Being 
concerned, he telephoned the Bank's attorney Brent Ward, who 
advised that he could proceed with the settlement. (R. 2037-38) 
Clapperton then insisted that the Bank execute a proof of loss form 
which contained the following language, "The said company in 
consideration of such payment to or for the named insured is hereby 
discharged forever from all further claims by reason of said loss 
or damage." (Ex. 11, p. 117; R. 2040) The reverse side of the 
settlement check given to the Bank also contained a total release 
of the Bank's claims for insurance. (Ex. 16) 
17. Mr. Murdock testified on behalf of the Bank that had 
he known about the other bids, he would not have settled for the 
$27,830.60, plus interest, because the large discrepancy between 
the bids would have called into question the validity of the Phipps 
bid. (R. 2039-40) Clapperton admitted that at the time he met with 
the Bank, he knew: (1) the Bank was relying upon the Phipps bid 
when it agreed to settle; (2) that the outstanding balance on the 
loan was close to $60,000.00; (3) that the settlement amount was 
insufficient to prevent the Bank from foreclosing; (4) that the 
Bank would seek any deficiency from the Crookstons and foreclose on 
the Crookstons' property; and (5) that experiencing foreclosure 
would be very traumatic to the Crookstons. (R. 1931, 2238-39, 
2261, 2265; Ex. 11, pp. 84, 86) 
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opposed to bankruptcy (R. 1816-17, 2412, 2119), but felt they had 
no choice and filed under Chapter 7 on July ll? 1982. (Ex. 6) The 
bankruptcy case is still open pending the outcome of this case. 
(R. 1864) To avoid additional interest, attorney's fees and costs, 
the Crookstons consented to a deed of their property to the Bank in 
lieu of the threatened foreclosure. (R. 1713-14; Ex. 30, p.222) 
20. There was overwhelming evidence that Clapperton was 
dishonest, not only in his actions at the time of his fraudulent 
scheme with the Bank, but also in his testimony at trial. His 
testimony was inconsistent with most other witnesses and documents. 
For example, at trial, he denied that his meeting with the Bank was 
for the purpose of settlement and claimed that the Bank forced him 
into settling. (R. 2255-56) Mr. Soderquist, Clapperton's super-
visor, testified, however, that Clapperton told him that he was 
leaving the office to settle with the Bank. (R. 1932-33) Clapper-
ton represented the Phipps bid ($27,830.60) as legitimate and the 
only amount owing under the policy even though he knew Fire 
Insurance's reserve (estimate of loss for internal accounting 
purposes) was set at $60,000. (R. 1912, 1914, 2269-70; Ex. 14) 
Clapperton's trial testimony even differed radically from his 
deposition testimony on material issues. (R« 2269-76, 2280-85) 
When his inconsistent testimony was pointed out to the jury, 
Clapperton became extremely nervous and clearly appeared as if he 
were lying, so much so that his attorney in closing statements 
tried to explain away his nervousness. (R. 2714-15) 
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a proof of loss form as grounds for denying 
their cJ vr3r pari- i cu'l ar"l v where the Crookstons 
were not provided with such a form, and 
adequate evidence of the loss had been provided 
to Fire Insurance. (R. 2325) 
j. Rejecting the bids of Brewster, 
Stallings and Jones because of insufficient 
detail, without requesting the additional 
information and detail, (R. 2326-27) 
k. Failing to disclose to the Crookstons 
that Fire Insurance was rejecting the other 
bids and the reasons therefor. (R. 2327-29) 
1. Not communicating with the Crookstons 
during the entire adjusting process. (R. 2329) 
m. Refusing to consider additional 
claims of the Crookstons after settling with 
the Bank, denying responsibility to the 
insurance commissioner when a complaint was 
filed by the Crookstons, and forcing the 
Crookstons to bring legal action. (R. 2330-31) 
n. Refusing to clean up after the 
collapse even after the city had given notice 
and threatened to condemn the property due to 
the hazardous situation. (R. 2332) 
o. Delaying over six months while the 
Crookston home was unfit for occupation, before 
making any attempts to settle. (R. 23 33) 
p. Maintaining a company policy that the 
only duty of an adjuster is to protect the 
financial interest of the insurance company and 
not the insured. (R. 1894-95, 2333) 
22. In an attempt to seek redress without filing a legal 
action, the Crookstons complained to the Utah Insurance Department 
shortly before October 18, 1982. (R. 2226; Ex. 9, pp. 24-27) Fire 
Insurance responded on November 2, 1982, and denied that any amount 
was owing to the Crookstons. (Ex. 9, pp. 28-31) The insurance 
department finally responded on January 10, 1983, stating that it 
did not have the resources to resolve this dispute and suggested 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury found Fire Insurance Exchange liable to the 
Crookstons for breach of contract, breach of its implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. On appeal, Fire Insurance claims (1) that the 
trial court erred with respect to jury instructions on comparative 
bad faith and fraud, (2) that the evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to establish the elements of fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, (3) that the compensatory and 
punitive damage awards were excessive, (4) that punitive damages 
are unconstitutional, (5) that the Crookstons claims are barred by 
a contractual time limitation, (6) that the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding attorneys fees to the Crookstons, and 
(7) that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
continue the trial and by dismissing Rocky Mountain State Bank, In 
response, Crookstons argue as follows. 
The trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on 
comparative bad faith was proper, because comparative bad faith is 
a tort concept not applicable to contract actions. The trial court 
did, however, properly instruct the jury that either party can 
breach the contract and that it could not award contract damages 
for injuries not caused by Fire Insurance's breach. 
Fire Insurance has waived its right to contest the fraud 
instructions because it failed to object to the instructions at 
trial. Notwithstanding this waiver, Fire Insurance was not 
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Fire Insurance acted in bad faith. Additionally, there are two 
Utah statutes which tolled the running of the limitation. At the 
very most, the limitation can only act to bar the Crookstons7 
contract action. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect 
to the award of attorney's fees, which are awardable for fraud and 
bad faith. The trial court determined the amount of the award 
after considering specific and extensive evidence relevant to the 
guidelines previously set by this Court. Fire Insurance has either 
waived or not been prejudiced by other claimed defects in the fee 
award. 
The trial court did not err in refusing to continue the 
trial date while Fire Insurance sought alternative grounds for a 
contribution claim against Rocky Mountain State Bank. After having 
completed four years of discovery, Fire Insurance presented at 
trial all of its evidence against the Bank and argued that the Bank 
caused the Crookstons' injuries. In any event, Fire Insurance had 
no vested right to have its contribution claims adjudicated in the 
Crookstons action against Fire Insurance and nothing prohibits it 
now from pursuing any such claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY'S FINDINGS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD 
AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
At trial, plaintiffs asserted four causes of action: 
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the insurer 11•<i <" • JiL-1• i * • ' « > • * c u n u J t -\- - o ^ i p r o -
c a l d u t i ( " ut I)IMI(| f a i t h , t h e i.^  ^ p r e s s ^ . e 
Gil l t o r r n n c o u r t s ' h o l d i n q t h a t a b r e r- :fc t <> : faith 
g i v e s r i s e in .1 tui 1 w 1 nun 1« it In ~:i*~ * * -* a 
breach is the basis for an action in mtra, t, Accordingly .e 
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the California courts may accept the notion of comparing the 
insurer's and the insured's tortious conduct, such comparative 
principles do not apply in a contract action. Were this Court to 
accept Fire Insurance's invitation to engraft a tort concept in a 
contract action, it would clearly be a step backward from Beck. 
Furthermore, Fire Insurance's position is contrary to its vigorous 
argument to the trial court that this case can only give rise to a 
cause of action in contract, not one in tort. (See Fire Insur-
ance's Trial Memorandum, R. 1436) 
Fire Insurance attempts to rationalize the blending of 
tort and contract by reference to the Utah Liability Reform Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 through 43 (1987) in which "fault" is 
defined as the breach of any Legal duty. This Court has speci-
fically held that the Liability Reform Act does not apply to 
conduct occurring prior to 1986. Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P. 2d 
952 (Utah 1987). The conduct here occurred during 1982, well 
before passage of the act. 
Since the proposed instruction was erroneous as a matter 
of law, it obviously follows that the failure to give the instruc-
tion was not prejudicial error. Snvderville Transportation Co. 
Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980),, 
In any event, the issue of whether plaintiffs' conduct 
caused any of the alleged damages was presented and extensively 
argued to the jury in the context of a contract action. From its 
opening statement, Fire Insurance criticized the plaintiffs and 
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3. Did the plaintiffs breach the contract of 
insurance with defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange? Answer: NO. 
4. If you answered question No. 3 "yes," was 
such breach a proximate cause of the damages 
alleged by plaintiffs? Answer: N/A (R. 1534) 
The trial court did not deny or restrict Fire Insurance's right to 
present evidence or argue that plaintiffs' actions and omissions 
caused their damages. On the contrary, such position was a major 
part of appellant's case. With good reason, however, the jury did 
not find appellant's position persuasive* 
C. There Is Ample Evidence To Support A Finding That Fire Insur-
ance Defrauded and Intentionally Inflicted Emotional Distress On 
The Crookstons. 
1. Fire Insurance Bears the Burden of Demon-
strating that the Crookstons' Evidence Was 
Insufficient to Support the Jury's Verdict. 
The standard for reviewing a trial court's refusal to 
grant a motion for a directed verdict, judgment n.o.v., or new 
trial was stated in McCloud v. Baum, 569 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1977) as 
follows: 
In reviewing denial of motions for a directed 
verdict, judgment n.o.v., or in the alternative 
for a new trial, this court must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party against whom the motion was made. 
In reviewing a trial court's exercise of 
discretion upon a motion for a new trial, this 
court examines the record to determine whether 
the evidence to support the verdict was 
completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust. If there be an 
evidentiary basis for the jury's decision, then 
the denial of the new trial must be affirmed. 
22 
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to motions for a dniuite 1 verdict \ i igment 
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and to afford him the benefit of all inferences 
which the evidence fairly supports, :r reason-
able persons could reach differing conclusions 
on the issue in controversy, a jury question 
exists and the motion should be denied. 
i,u. Fiirthermorp, in Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium 
Co. , 704 r . <.a I "DIM , I I. ; ? -hat: 
* .arty bringing the challenge has the burden 
marshalling all the evidence in support of 
Llie findings ana demonstrating that the 
evidence is insufficient, even when viewed in 
the light most favorah'* • ^ findings. 
[Citations omitted. 
Id. it " ' ,)^ t .1, . i ^t^rrot-pH *-
marsh a • ; ie e v i d e n c e \~\ rnt? i gn t **-: l a v . i d i ^ 
In11 uxie tc-"t-^ ir~ !+"< f*v>r . 
2. Fire Insurance luinuiitL^a u L> ±^* ,., in*r Jrookstons. 
•*• The facts closely parallel a thira ^ i , 
insurance situation. 
In Beck • d it *' t.MS Ccurt disc li.vju.iL 
* • - 'durance ^o^t-ra^t -- thirjs-pdrr. 
nsuranofr Mt.tdtiun, tile ,/^uie r —
 : v e . 
because "ne insurer I^-.KK? respons IJD I i i . . . 
laimp of t/.ird parties against t* 
.nsure coniiu^, * -l^uat"1'' *• <=• 
insure isured a re near ly a d v e r s a r i e s , Lvjja —-
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The instant case is a hybrid of the first and third-party 
situations. The Crookstons were subject to third-party claims of 
the Bank under the terms of the construction loan agreement. 
Because the Bank was a loss payee, Fire Insurance Exchange, in 
essence, was in the position of protecting the named insureds, the 
Crookstons, from claims of the Bank. 
Crookstons admit that Fire Insurance had no contractual 
fiduciary duties to the Crookstons, but equity certainly implied 
such duties in the circumstances of this case. In discussing the 
basis for fiduciary relationships in Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Union-
america. Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982), the Court stated: 
A fiduciary or confidential relationship may be 
created by contract or by circumstances where 
equity will imply a higher duty in a relation-
ship because the trusting party has been 
induced to relax the care and vigilance he 
would ordinarily exercise. [Emphasis added.] 
657 P. 2d at 749. Fire Insurance cannot have it both ways. Either 
it had fiduciary duties to protect the Crookstons' interests during 
the negotiations with the Bank or it had a duty not to interfere 
with the Crookstons7 ability to represent their own interests in 
the negotiations. 
Fraud has many guises as was recognized by the Court in 
Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 (Utah 1978): 
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the 
multifarious means which human ingenuity can 
devise and are resorted to in order to gain an 
advantage over another. 
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induced the other party not to investigate. Adamson v. Brockbank, 
112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). 
c. There is ample evidence to establish all 
elements of fraud. 
Clapperton was in possession of three bids in excess of 
$49,000 and had authority to settle for $49,443. Nonetheless, he 
sought and obtained a fictitious bid which was just a little more 
than one-half of the other bids received. The evidence was 
undisputed that the bid did not account for many items and was 
based on an engineering report which was not intended to be the 
basis for a bid. Clapperton knew the bid was insufficient, that 
the Crookstons would object to the bid, and that the Bank would not 
settle for such an amount if the other bids were disclosed. Hence, 
in order to accomplish his scheme, Clapperton simply told Mr. Klemm 
that he had no authority to settle, concealed the existence of the 
Phipps bid, and surreptitiously conducted his negotiations with the 
Bank. The fraud was complete when he refused to deal further with 
the Crookstons and the Crookstons could do nothing to prevent the 
Bank from taking their property. 
All elements of fraud were satisfied. First, Clapperton 
made representations and concealed material facts—the amount of 
money necessary to restore the home; the amount owing under the 
policy; his lack of readiness to settle; his inclusion of the 
Crookstons in settlement negotiations with the Bank; concealment of 
the Phipps bid and settlement meeting with the Bank; and conceal-
ment of the other three bids from the Bank. Second, the represen-
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tations concerned presently existing facts—the amount required to 
complete the home; Clapperton's authority to settle; Clapperton's 
state of mind and intention; the existence of the bids and settle-
ment meetings. Third, the representations were false—the Phipps 
bid was incomplete and not representative of the true amount to 
complete the structure; other amounts were owing under the policy; 
Clapperton had authority to settle with the Bank; Clapperton had no 
intention of including the Crookstons in the negotiations. Fourth, 
Clapperton clearly knew the representations were false or at the 
very least made them in reckless disregard. Fifth, the representa-
tions were intended to induce action on the part of the Bank and 
inaction on the part of the Crookstons—Clapperton induced the Bank 
to settle for an inadequate amount; Clapperton lulled the 
Crookstons into not acting to protect their interests until the 
settlement with the Bank was complete. Sixth, the Bank and the 
Crookstons acted in ignorance of the truth—the Bank was not aware 
of the other bids which Clapperton had obtained; the Crookstons 
were not aware of the Phipps bid and did not intervene because 
Clapperton did not inform them of the negotiations. Seventh, the 
Bank relied on the Phipps bid and the Crookstons relied on 
Clapperton7s representation that they would be included in negotia-
tions. Eighth, the Bank was induced to act and the Crookstons were 
lulled into inaction. Ninth, the Crookstons were injured when the 
Bank took their property and forced them into bankruptcy. The 
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evidence is clear and convincing that Clapperton practiced a fraud 
on the Crookstons. 
d. There is no justification for this court's 
review of jury instruction nos. 28 and 29. 
(1) Fire Insurance was waived its right of 
review. 
Fire Insurance properly notes that it failed to except to 
Instructions Nos. 28 and 29. Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure expressly provides that, "No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto." Fire Insurance seeks haven in the rare exception to the 
rule. 
This Court has discussed the exception to Rule 51 on 
numerous occasions. See, for example, E.A. Strout Western Realty 
Agency Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983), 
Wagner v. Olsen. 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971), and McCall 
v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962 (1954). In each of these 
instances, the Court required the party seeking review of the 
instruction to present a persuasive reason or special circumstance 
which would warrant the invocation of the exception. The factors 
which the Court considers in granting an exception were stated in 
Holton v. Holton. 121 Utah 451, 243 P.2d 438, 439 (1952): 
Although the New Rules of Civil Procedure were 
intended to provide liberality in procedure, it 
is nevertheless expected that they will be 
followed, and unless reasons satisfactory to 
the court are advanced as a basis for relief 
from complying with them, parties will not be 
excused from so doing. It is only when a 
showing is made that some inadvertence, 
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surprise, excusable neglect or mistake has 
occurred and that substantial injustice will be 
done, that a party will be relieved from 
failure to comply with the rules. [Citations 
omitted.] 
Fire Insurance claims that there will be an injustice 
done if the Court does not consider the allegedly erroneous 
instructions. However, it is clear that the requirement is two-
fold—the proponent must demonstrate not only an injustice but also 
some extenuating circumstance which warrants departure from the 
rule. Fire Insurance has not even attempted to state a reason for 
its failure to except to the jury instructions. Thus, it has not 
justified its call upon the discretion of +"*-»s Court to review the 
instructions. 
(2) The claimed error in the fraud instruction 
was not prejudicial. 
Not all error constitutes grounds for reversal. The 
error must be "substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that unfairness or injustice has 
resulted." Ewell and Son. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 27 Utah 2d 
188, 493 P.2d 1283, 1288 (1972). The claimed error in Instruction 
28 (fraud) has not resulted in any unfairness or injustice to Fire 
Insurance. 
Instruction 28 was an adaptation of a model instruction 
used in the federal courts. Devitt, Blackmar and Wolff, Federal 
Jury Practice and Instructions, 4th Ed. § 83.02 (1987). Fire 
Insurance claims this instruction is erroneous in that it failed to 
include certain elements including (lj the misrepresentation must 
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concern a presently existing fact, (2) the misrepresentation must 
have been made for the purpose of inducing the Crookstons or the 
Bank in behalf of Crookstons to act upon it, and (3) the reliance 
was made in ignorance of the misrepresentation's falsity. However, 
the record is clear that substantial or admitted evidence of each 
of these elements was presented to the jury. 
It is unrefuted (1) that Clapperton did not disclose to 
the Bank the three other bids (R. 2039), and (2) that he represent-
ed to the Bank that the Phipps bid would fully repair the home and 
the amount of the Phipps bid was all that was owing under the 
policy. (R. 2038) Mr. Murdock testified that he would not have 
settled based upon the Phipps bid had he known about the other 
bids. (R. 2040, 2317-18) Clapperton further admitted that he knew 
the Bank was relying on the Phipps bid. (R. 2261) 
Clapperton further represented to Klemm on June 16 that 
Fire Insurance was not yet ready to settle but would shortly get 
back to Klemm. There was no disclosure of the Phipps bid. (R. 
1700-1) At this time Clapperton had already received the Phipps 
bid and had set up the settlement meeting with the Bank. (R. 2035-
37) Klemm described how he was trusting the adjusters to deal in 
good faith and felt betrayed after he learned of the settlement. 
(R. 1677-78, 1704) Without the opportunity to be involved in the 
settlement, Klemm could not disclose the other bids and point out 
why the Bank should not settle for such a small amount. (R. 1733-
35, 2313-14, 2506) Once the Bank had settled and released its 
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claim for insurance, it had no alternative but to collect the 
balance from the Crookstons. Since the Crookstons had no money, 
this directly resulted in their bankruptcy and loss of their home. 
(R. 1851, 1882-83, 2480-1, 2505-6) 
All of the above misrepresentations and concealments con-
cerned presently existing facts and were made for the purpose of 
inducing Crookstons (through their attorney) and the Bank to act or 
refrain from acting to their detriment. Though Clapperton denies 
making some of the above misrepresentations to Klemm, there is no 
evidence that prior to the settlement Klemm or the Bank knew the 
falsity of said misrepresentations. Further, Instruction 28 stated 
that to find fraud, the Crookstons and their agent must be 
"deceived" by the representations, which is equivalent to the third 
missing element at issue. Therefore, each of the omitted elements 
asserted by appellant were supported by admitted, uncontested or 
clear and convincing evidence, resulting in no unfairness, injus-
tice, or prejudice to Fire Insurance. 
(3) Instruction No. 29 states the appropriate 
law. 
Fire Insurance maintains that since the Crookstons and 
Fire Insurance were in a first-party contract situation, the 
parties were practically adversaries and therefore "the Crookstons 
were not entitled to 'heedlessly accept as true' whatever Fire 
Insurance told them." (Appellant's Brief, p. 58) Fire Insurance 
misperceives what this Court said in Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). Beqk distinguished the third-
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party insurance situation from the first-party insurance situation, 
i.e. fiduciary vs. non-fiduciary duties. Beck does not stand for 
the proposition that an insurer in a first-party insurance contract 
may totally disregard the interests of the insured in the exercise 
of its own rights. 
Although the insurer in a first-party contract situation 
may not necessarily be a fiduciary, the insurer is not held to a 
lower standard than other businesses in the community. The 
argument that Fire Insurance makes here is similar to the argument 
made in Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P. 2d 798 
(Utah 1980) wherein a bank which had fraudulently induced the 
defendants to sign promissory notes argued that the defendants had 
no right to rely on the Bank's representations. In addressing this 
issue, the Court forcefully rejected such a contention: 
It can hardly be maintained that the general 
moral level of business and other financial 
relationships would be enhanced by a rule of 
law which would allow a person to defend 
against a willful, deliberate fraud by stating, 
"You should not have trusted or believed me" or 
"Had you not been so gullible you would not 
have been [so] deceived." The rules governing 
fraud should foster intercourse based on trust, 
forthrightness, and honesty. [Citations 
omitted.] 
607 P. 2d at 805. Although the Crookstons and Fire Insurance 
Exchange had competing interests in the adjustment of the loss, 
this so called adversarial posture did not place the Crookstons in 
a position where they had no right to place trust in what Fire 
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Insurance was saying or excuse Fire Insurance from being forthright 
and honest. 
Insurance companies have steadfastly maintained the right 
to rely on representations of insureds. In fact, insurers may seek 
rescission or deny coverage based upon an insured's material mis-
representation, omission or concealment^ . Beraer v. Minnesota 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of St. Paul, Minnesota, 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 
1988); see also, Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8(1) (1974).2 There is no 
justification for a double standard, particularly at the expense of 
an insured. 
The jury was instructed (No. 20) that the policy did not 
"create a relationship of trust and reliance," between the parties 
(R. 1500) This instruction was sufficient to meet appellant's 
concern and when Instructions 20 and 29 are read together, there is 
no prejudice in any event. 
3. Fire Insurance Intentionally Inflicted 
Emotional Distress on the Crookstons. 
a. The actions of Fire Insurance were extreme and 
outrageous. 
Fire Insurance cites Saltou v. Dependable Insurance Co., 
394 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) for the erroneous proposition 
that any act connected with a contract cannot constitute a tort. 
This certainly is not the case in Utah where this Court has stated, 
" . . . acts constituting a breach of contract may also result in 
2This section has now been replaced by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
21-105(2) (as amended) effective July 1, 1986. 
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breaches of duty that are independent of the contract and may give 
rise to causes of action in tort." Beck, 701 P.2d at 800 n. 3. 
See also DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983). The 
fact that a contractual relationship exists between two parties 
does not immunize one party from liability in tort to the other. 
Indeed, the contract may place a party in the very position which 
enables the tort to arise. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment e (1965) 
explicitly notes that abuse of the power to affect a party can be 
the basis upon which extreme and outrageous behavior may be found: 
The extreme and outrageous character of the 
conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of 
a position, or a relation with the other, which 
gives him actual or apparent authority over the 
other, or power to affect his interests. 
As noted above, when the Crookstons7 house collapsed, Fire Insur-
ance had contractual duties to both the Crookstons and the Bank. 
The relationship between the Crookstons and Fire Insurance was 
closely akin to a third party liability situation where failure to 
properly resolve the third party claim would result in personal 
exposure to the insured. Here, Fire Insurance's payment to the 
Bank (loss payee) had a direct and immediate impact on the 
Crookstons. 
Fire Insurance has cited cases wherein intentional 
infliction of emotional distress was not found,, In each of these 
cases the alleged wrongful conduct was only the insurer's failure 
to investigate or to bargain w|th the claimants. Courts, however, 
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have found intentional infliction of emotional distress in circum-
stances where the insurer has abused its position by overt acts 
which have gone beyond protecting the insurer's legitimate inter-
ests. The distinction is overt action as opposed to inaction. 
See, for example, National Security Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bowen, 
447 So.2d 133 (Ala. 1983) (investigators misrepresented themselves 
as policemen, threatened insured, attempted to bribe witness); 
Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 10 
Cal. App. 3d 376 (1970) (adjuster terminated disability payments on 
false allegation of pre-existing condition); Dominauez v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Society. 438 So.2d 58 (Fla, Ct. App. 1983) aff'd 467 
So.2d 281 (Fla. 1985) (adjuster lied about doctor's report, misrep-
resented policy coverage and attempted to obtain release from 
policyholder under duress) ; and Green v. State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Co. . 667 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1982) (insurer took sworn 
statement and gave to police for arson prosecution, adjuster 
threatened prosecution even when he knew there was insufficient 
evidence for such prosecution, and adjuster masquerading as 
policeman informed neighbors of suspected arson). In each of the 
foregoing cases, the insurer stepped beyond the bounds of civilized 
conduct while adjusting claims. Such is the case here. 
A bank will always seek collection of the balance owing 
on a loan and pursue foreclosure when immediate collection appears 
unlikely. When a significant loss has occurred and an insurer 
improperly settles with a mortgagee bank, the insured is parti-
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cularly vulnerable because such a loss usually causes severe 
financial hardship. 
Clapperton admittedly knew that the Bank would look to 
the Crookstons for any monies not paid by the insurance, yet he 
purposely sought an incomplete and unrealistic bid from an insider, 
concealed the bid from the Crookstons and deliberately kept the 
Crookstons from being represented in the negotiations. Fire 
Insurance left the Crookstons fully vulnerable', to foreclosure and 
bankruptcy with all its emotional consequences. (R. 1839, 1851, 
1882-83) Such overt conduct was an abuse of Fire Insurance's 
position and constituted extreme and outrageous conduct which 
should not be tolerated in civilized society. 
b. The Crookstons suffered severe emotional dis-
tress. 
This Court has yet to define what constitutes severe 
emotional distress. However, the California Appellate Court 
addressed the issue in Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 10 Cal. App. 3d 376 (1970): 
The term "severe emotional distress" is 
discussed in comment j to section 4 6 of the 
Restatement of Torts, Second • . . . "Complete 
emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in 
this world, and some degree of transient and 
trivial emotional distress is a part of the 
price of living among people. The law inter-
venes only where the distress inflicted is so 
severe that no reasonable man could be expected 
to endure it. The intensity and duration of 
the distress are factors to be considered in 
determining its severity." It appears, 
therefore, that in this context, "severe" means 
substantial or enduring as distinguished from 
trivial or transitory. Severe emotional dis-
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tress means, then, emotional distress of such 
substantial quantity or enduring quality that 
no reasonable man in a civilized society should 
be expected to endure it, [Citations omitted.] 
89 Cal. Rptr. at 90. The distress suffered here did not result 
from frustration inherent in the normal adjusting process. Rather, 
the evidence showed that the Crookstons severely suffered from a 
financial collapse which forced them into bankruptcy with all its 
attendant embarrassment and humiliation. 
Mr. Crookston, faced with the dramatic reversal in his 
finances and with the loss of his home, was unable to continue his 
work, school, and life in general. He described his condition 
after the settlement: 
I was numb. I stopped feeling . . . whenever 
I'd think about it, first it was pain and then 
it went to rage, disgust, bitterness, hatred, 
revenge, and those thoughts consumed my mind . 
basically, I stopped being rational, I 
guess. I broke down. I couldn't do the things 
that I did before. I found them — my self-
esteem was gone. I felt that I had lost the 
respect of everyone that knew m^. I felt that 
I was a failure and became paranoid and afraid 
of what everybody thought of me. It appeared 
that my wife at the time had lost confidence in 
me to support her and to provide for my family. 
These are things that I was always proud of. I 
always worked very hard . . . . for all the 
work I'd ever done since before I was in high 
school up until that time, I had worked very 
hard and I was proud of what I did. I always 
did a good job and what was it for? What? 
What was the end result? I had lost every-
thing. I was bankrupt, and I lost motivation. 
I lost self-confidence. I lost the ability to 
think properly, to make proper judgments, to 
even think about what I was doing. (R. 2121-
24) 
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He admitted having a nervous breakdown. (R. 2197) Mr. Klemm 
described him as a "basket case." (R. 1711) At trial nearly four 
years after the settlement, Mr. Crookston testified that he was 
still unable to be fully functional due to the suffering from this 
traumatic incident. (R. 2125-28) 
Mrs. Crookston described her emotional suffering: 
. . . It was a devastation to me. I felt like 
I was trying to pick myself up, and that upon 
hearing that it was over with between the 
insurance company and the bank, that somebody 
was trying to pound me into the ground, that I 
was the nail, and they were hitting me on the 
head, and that the settlement started this nail 
going into the ground, and then with the— 
with this person suing me, that was just 
another hit on the head driving me into the 
ground a little further, and then having to go 
through the bankruptcy and the humiliation of 
taking out the bankruptcy, that the nail was 
being pounded further and further into the 
ground. 
Then there was an article in the newspaper 
about us losing our house, and it was just 
another blow on the head. Then to have my 
father co-sign for a loan, I mean, I felt like 
that nail was practically driven into the 
ground, and that I have been trying to pull 
that nail out of the ground all these years. 
(R. 2415) 
She then described how she felt useless, that life was not worth 
living, and the only thing that kept her going was her two child-
ren. (R. 2416-17) Far from being transitory or trivial the 
Crookstons emotional stress was enduring, substantial, and there-
fore compensable under the terms of Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
§ 46 (1965). 
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c. The emotional distress was proximately caused 
by Fire Insurance/s conduct. 
The collapse of the house certainly had an impact on the 
Crookstons. However, the Crookstons considered it a temporary set-
back since the insurance policy was there to provide a new start. 
(R. 2017) After the collapse, the Crookstons continued to work and 
meet their financial responsibilities. (R. 1839, 1851, 2017-18) 
Mr. Crookston returned to school to complete his education. (R. 
2225) It was only after the settlement with the Bank, the loss of 
the Crookston^' property and the bankruptcy that Mr. Crookston was 
unable to continue working and to pursue his degree at the univer-
sity. 
The trial judge instructed the jury in at least two 
different instructions (Instruction Nos. 25 and 37, R. 1506, 1520) 
that it could award damages only for injuries proximately caused by 
Fire Insurance's wrongful conduct. Furthermore, Crookstons' 
counsel in closing argument reaffirmed th&t the Crookstons were not 
seeking compensation for emotional distress caused by other 
factors: 
Nowr building a home [is a] very stressful 
situation for anyone. No one is going to deny 
that. They suffered a great deal of stress as 
they went through the struggles and the 
problems of building a home. They are not 
seeding compensation for that, obviously not, 
but a collapse occurred, a loss that was 
insured. That was also very emotionally 
traumatic. They are not seeking compensation 
for that. (R. 2680) 
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There is nothing in the record which would support a contention 
that the jury awarded any damages for emotional distress that Fire 
Insurance did not proximately cause. 
II. THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGE AWARD WAS NOT EXCESSIVE. 
A. The Evidence Of Specific Economic Loss Is Uncontested. 
The jury awarded the Crookstons $815,826.00 in compen-
satory damages. After calculating the Crookstons' losses, includ-
ing Mr. Crookston's past income and the future income he would 
continue to lose during the three year period after trial while Mr. 
Crookston completed his degree, economist Paul Randle testified 
that the Crookstons' special damages were $323,399.00. Fire Insur-
ance has not contested the economic losses on appeal but claims 
that the remainder of the compensatory award was excessive. 
It is important to note that Dr. Randle's computations 
were based upon the assumption that Mr. Crookston would receive 
monetary recovery at the time of trial, thus allowing him the means 
to emotionally and financially recover, and by 1990, he would be 
able to complete his education and be gainfully employed. (R. 
2465) Obviously, Mr. Crookston has received no recovery due to 
this appeal, which means his economic damages would be even 
greater. 
B. The General Damages Awarded Were Appropriate. 
Larry and Randi Crookston each suffered as the result of 
Fire Insurance's wrongful and egregious acts cind each should be 
compensated for his and her individual emotional and mental 
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distress. Furthermore, as was noted at trial, Larry and Randi 
Crookston are no longer married. Accordingly, the $246,213.50 
awarded to each plaintiff for general damages will not be used to 
maintain a single household. 
Fire Insurance incorrectly asserts that the $246,213.50 
awarded to each of the Crookstons compensated them only for their 
emotional distress, anxiety, loss of joy of life, and motivation. 
Although these losses were substantial the general damages also 
included an award for the loss of credit or financial reputation. 
The Court specifically has noted that such an award is appropriate 
as a foreseeable consequence for bad faith conduct. Beck, 701 P.2d 
at 802. 
Mr. Crookston testified that after the bankruptcy, he 
reaffirmed the debt on his credit card in an attempt to preserve 
his standing with his bank. Notwithstanding the payment of the 
debt, the bank cancelled his credit card. (R. 2119-20) Mr. 
Crookston further testified that after being solicited by a finance 
company to borrow money, he was unable to obtain a loan when the 
lender found that the Crookstons had once declared bankruptcy. (R. 
2120-21) Mrs. Crookston had a similar experience. She testified 
that she applied for a loan to finance a musical instrument, 
allowing the instrument to be used as security. The Bank refused 
to extend credit to her unless her father agreed to co-sign the 
note. (R. 2413-14) 
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Although Dr. Randle was unable to quantify the exact 
amount of the loss caused by the bankruptcy, he testified that the 
inability to obtain credit is a real and significant loss, espe-
cially in today's society where very few people have the resources 
to pay cash for items such as automobiles and homes. (R. 2476-77) 
Even though the jury did not specify the amount awarded for the 
loss of financial reputation, the law permitted such an award to 
each plaintiff. 
Fire Insurance cites the Court's reduction of damages for 
mental distress in First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 
653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) to bolster its contention that the damages 
awarded here were excessive. The factual situations are signifi-
cantly dissimilar. In J.B.J. Feedvards, a bank had wrongfully 
obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment on some of the interven-
ing plaintiffs' business assets—266 head of cattle. The interven-
ing plaintiffs were unable to sell the cattle and use the proceeds 
until the attachment was lifted and an appeal completed. As a 
result, the intervening plaintiffs claimed dctmages for anxiety, 
frustration and embarrassment among other claims for damages. 
There is no indication that the intervenors' lives were affected 
outside the business context in which the wrongful act occurred or 
that the intervenors were forced into bankruptcy. 
By contrast, the circumstances here are far more compel-
ling. The Crookstons had been planning and saving for many years 
to attain their dream of owning a home. Mr. Crookston had been 
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working two jobs and attending school to upgrade his employment. 
After the collapse, the insurance policy provided the means to 
salvage the dream. As recognized in Beck, 701 P.2d at 802, an 
insurance policy is specifically designed and marketed as a means 
to preserve the policyholder's emotional security in times of 
misfortune. In this case, however, the insurer's wrongful acts not 
only robbed the Crookstons of their dream but turned the dream into 
a nightmare wherein they lost their property, savings, financial 
reputation, emotional well-being and mental health. This was no 
temporary business reversal as occurred in the J.B.J. Feedvards 
case. Fire Insurance destroyed the very foundation of the family's 
security. 
This Court has recognized that mental suffering is no 
less real because it is unaccompanied by physical injury. In 
Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975), the Court 
considered the award of damages for slander stating: 
It is of course to be appreciated that there 
are difficulties involved in placing an exact 
dollar-and-cents valuation on damages caused by 
an injury of this character. However, when 
physical injury is involved, courts have no 
hesitancy in allowing and approving substantial 
awards as general damages which include pain 
and suffering. The pain and suffering inflic-
ted on the mind and the emotions by such 
wrongful act of another is no less real; and 
should be no less entitled to be compensated 
for. [Emphasis added.] 
The Court did express concern in J.B.J. Feedyards that 
emotional distress damages should be awarded with caution. 653 
P.2d at 598. This concern is shared by other courts and commen-
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tatorsc However, such concern is assuaged in two circumstances— 
first, where the nature of the conduct is so egregious that 
emotional distress naturally flows therefrom, and second, where the 
trial judge has specifically reviewed the propriety of the award. 
Both circumstances are present here. 
Professor Prosser in discussing the rationale supporting 
the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress commented upon the relationship between the conduct and 
the need for physical harm in emotional distress cases as follows: 
The change in the Restatement in 1948 rejected 
any absolute necessity for physiccil results. 
Probably the conclusion to be reached is that 
where physical harm is lacking the courts will 
properly tend to look for more in the way of 
extreme outrage as an assurance that the mental 
disturbance claimed is not fictitious; but that 
if the enormity of the outrage itself carries 
conviction that there has in fact been severe 
and serious emotional distress, which is 
neither feigned nor trivial, bodily harm is not 
required. 
Prosser, "Insult and Outrage," 44 Cal. L. Rev. 40, 53 (1956). As 
detailed elsewhere, the actions of Fire Insuramce were extreme and 
outrageous. There is nothing fictitious or trivial about the 
Crookstons' bankruptcy and loss of their property. Given the 
egregious conduct and succeeding events, there is no doubt that the 
Crookstons claims for mental and emotional distress are real, 
unfeigned and far from trivial. 
The Court has previously observed that, " . . . when the 
determination of the jury has been submitted to the scrutiny and 
judgment of the trial judge, his action thereon should be regarded 
as giving further solidarity to the judgment." Elkington v. Foust, 
618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980). Fire Insurance in its motion for new 
trial or judgment n.o.v. presented the same arguments it is now 
making concerning the alleged excessiveness of the award. In 
denying the motions, the trial court stated: 
I have reviewed my notes and I recall the 
evidence in the regard that I am referring to 
and I am not in the least persuaded that the 
jury in this case overstepped their bounds in 
awarding excessive general damages and punitive 
damages. On the contrary, this case, in mv 
judgment, could well have resulted in greater 
damages than were awarded by the jury. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Record 2996, at 40. 
The Court has often stated the standard when reviewing 
the amount of the jury's award. The Court's comments in Wilson v. 
Oldroyd, 1 Utah 362, 267 P.2d 759, 764 (1954), a case involving 
alienation of affections with consequent emotional distress, appear 
particularly appropriate in this case: 
The question of damages in such instance seems 
best addressed to the discretion of a jury; 
they have homes, spouses and children of their 
own, are experienced in the practical affairs 
of daily life, and have different points of 
view; and they are afforded the benefit of 
seeing and hearing the parties and their 
witnesses. Because of their advantaged 
position courts are extremely reluctant to 
interfere with their verdicts. This is 
necessarily so in order that the right of trial 
by jury assured under our law be preserved. If 
courts were prone to set aside jury verdicts 
and substitute their own judgments therefore 
whenever they disagreed with the jury, the 
right would be abrogated and the jury system 
would be but a pretense. The concept of trial 
by jury necessarily presupposes that there is a 
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wide area within which the pendulum of the 
jury's deliberation may swing without inter-
ference from the court. And so long as they 
remain within the boundaries of what reasonable 
minds could believe their findings should 
remain inviolate. 
The evidence is abundant and compelling that Fire Insurance 
wrongfully and seriously injured the Crookstons. Even in the view 
of the trial judge, the compensatory award could have been larger. 
Reasonable minds without passion or prejudice could well award the 
damages given here, and the compensatory damage award should there-
fore stand. 
III. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD WAS NOT EXCESSIVE IN 
VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE AND NATURE OF FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE'S CONDUCT. 
A
* Elements Of Punitive Damages. 
In a number of recent decisions this Court has explicitly 
outlined seven elements that a jury should consider before awarding 
punitive damages. See, for example, First Security Bank of Utah v. 
J.B.J. Feedvards. 653 P.2d 591, 598-99 (Utah 1982). Fire Insurance 
submitted a proposed jury instruction almost identical to the 
Crookstons' on the seven elements. (R. 1391) Fire Insurance 
simply argues that there was insufficient evidence under each 
element to justify the punitive damage award. 
Trial judge Dennis Frederick is a highly respected judge 
with many years on the bench. Prior to his judicial appointment, 
Judge Frederick had an extensive trial practice including insurance 
defense. As ijoted above, Judge Frederick concluded that the 
46 
members of the jury had not overstepped their bounds in awarding 
punitive damages. Judge Frederick described the actions of Fire 
Insurance as pernicious: 
During the course of the ten or so days that we 
tried the case, it was my observation that 
indeed we were dealing here with conduct which 
was pernicious, pernicious not merely in the 
sense of the defendant having taken und[ue] 
advantage of the insureds, the Crookstons, in 
treating their claim in a high-handed fashion, 
but pernicious further in the sense that clear, 
unequivocal misrepresentations were made by 
agents of the defendant to the plaintiffs and 
to their counsel, and as if that were not 
sufficient, pernicious in the form of conduct 
which, while it may not have been geared to 
create emotional harm and suffering to the 
plaintiffs, was, at the very least, in reckless 
disregard of their rights by dealing sub rosa 
with the bank and thereafter closing the file 
and advising the plaintiffs the file, the claim 
file would be closed. 
(R. 2996, pp. 39-40) The evidence upon which Judge Frederick based 
his conclusion is extensive. The following are some of the facts 
which establish each element. 
1. Nature of the Wrongdoers Act. 
Before its settlement with the Bank, Fire Insurance was 
well aware that the Crookstons would lose their home in the event 
only $27,830.00 were paid toward the approximate $49,000.00 (plus 
interest) owed on the construction loan. Fire Insurance knew that 
the Crookstons had no means to pay the balance owing, since they 
were depending on permanent financing to retire the construction 
loan when the house was complete. (R. 1990, Ex. 11, p. 50) Prior 
to his insurance work, Kent Soderquist, Clapperton's supervisor, 
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had worked as a loan officer for a bank and was generally aware of 
the Bank's foreclosure rights under its deed of trust. (R. 1942) 
Both Soderquist and Clapperton were well aware that if insurance 
proceeds were not timely paid, the Bank would foreclose unless the 
insureds were able to pay the underlying loan. (R. 1943, 2236-39, 
2265) Furthermore, Fire Insurance had actual knowledge that the 
Bank was proceeding to foreclose on the Crookstons' property. (R. 
2277-79; Exhibit 15 p. 3) All of Fire Insurance's representatives 
acknowledged at trial that the purpose of insurance was to prevent 
extreme financial hardship and loss of property that would other-
wise occur but for insurance. 
Fire Insurance ratified and approved all of the actions 
taken by Moser, Clapperton and Soderquist. All witnesses testify-
ing in behalf of Fire Insurance admitted that those involved were 
acting within the scope of their employment and that their activi-
ties were consistent with company policy. (R. 1888-89, 2235) The 
Pocatello regional office and the district branch claims manager 
had reviewed the claims file routinely during all relevant times 
and had made various communications to the adjusters. (Exhibits 
11, 12 and 13) After the Crookstons filed a complaint with the 
insurance department, the regional office denied any responsibility 
to the Crookstons. (Exhibit 9 pp. 28-31) 
2. The Facts and Circumstances Surrounding 
Defendant's Misconduct. 
Since a perpetrator rarely admits that he was reckless or 
carried ill will toward his victim, such recklessness or ill will 
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must be established by circumstantial evidence. In view of Fire 
Insurance's knowledge of the Crookstons' circumstances and the 
consequences of the settlement with the Bank, there is no logical 
explanation of Clapperton's actions other than ill will, malice or 
total indifference toward the Crookstons. Having sought an inade-
quate bid and having excluded the Crookstons from the negotiations, 
Fire Insurance was in total control of the settlement with the 
Bank. Knowing that the settlement would have a devastating impact 
on the Crookstons, Clapperton nonetheless proceeded apparently 
without a second thought. 
3. The Relative Wealth Of Fire Insurance. 
Exhibit 18, Fire Insurance's 1986 financial statement, 
stated that the company's total assets were $723,468,116.00 and 
that its net income for the year was $23,000,000.00. The punitive 
damage award is not excessive, particularly in light of the 
circumstances of this case. 
4. The Effect of Defendant's Misconduct on the 
Lives of the Victims and Others. 
It is difficult to imagine how any insurance company 
could affect the lives of its insureds more than Fire Insurance has 
affected the Crookstons. However, Mr. and Mrs. Crookston are not 
the only victims. Obviously, Fire Insurance's actions have had a 
detrimental effect upon the Crookstons' children. Mrs. Crookston's 
parents who had loaned the Crookstons $12,000.00 for the construc-
tion of their home have never been repaid. (R. 2397) Even though 
the Bank proceeded with foreclosure and repossessed the Crookstons' 
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property, it still sustained a loss of up to $5,000.00. (R. 2047) 
All of the Crookstons' bankruptcy creditors are still unpaid and 
the bankruptcy case remains open after six years, pending the 
outcome of this case. (R. 1864) Subcontractors who had provided 
labor and material for the Crookstons' home (unrelated to the 
collapse) were forced to file liens and commence a lawsuit to be 
paid. (Exhibit 26) Fire Insurance failed to timely clean up the 
debris, thus creating a hazard for neighborhood children, which 
forced the city to seek condemnation of the Crookston property. 
(R. 1981-82) 
5. The Probability of Future Reoccurrence of 
the Misconduct. 
Fire Insurance has never admitted wrongdoing, taken any 
action to rectify the wrongs or reprimanded those who committed the 
acts. On the contrary, Clapperton, Soderquist and Moser (the only 
witnesses at trial for Fire Insurance) testified that they believed 
they had treated the Crookstons fairly. (R. 1937) In fact, 
Clapperton had the audacity to expressly state that he felt good 
about what he did to the Crookstons! (R. 2286) Fire Insurance has 
twice promoted Clapperton since his adjustment of the Crookston 
loss. He is now the district claims manager supervising the 
adjustment of all claims in northern Utah. (R. 2231-32) 
Mr. Moser, who has also been made a supervisor (R. 1968-
69) , testified that the handling of the Crookstons' claim was done 
according to company policy, was appropriate, and was handled in a 
fashion similar to the handling of other claims. (R. 2588-89) 
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Mr. Soderquist described Fire Insurance's claims adjust-
ing philosophy as follows: 
Q: Now, what is Mr. Moser's duty as it 
relates to the loss itself? Does he have 
any duty at all to try and find out on his 
own what the loss is? . . . 
A: Technically and literally according to the 
conditions of the policy, as I would 
interpret it, Mr. Moser's only duty was to 
the insurance company, which would be to 
obtain information to protect the insur-
ance company's interest. . . Any efforts 
that Mr. Moser made to help the insured to 
prove their loss would be beyond the scope 
of his actual duties as an adjuster. 
Q: . . . Are you saying that the adjuster, 
Mr. Moser, has no duty to try on his own 
to determine the amount of the loss? 
A: Yes, he does, to protect the insurance 
company's interests. 
Q: . . . Do you feel that Mr. Moser's duty 
was in any way designed to try and protect 
the Crookstons or to help them? 
A: Technically, I don't think an adjuster's 
duty is to protect the interests of the 
insured. I think all insurance companies 
do that as a public relations matter, but, 
technically they are not required to. 
Q: Was this the position taken by Mr. Moser 
and you in the Crookston case? 
A: Yes. 
(R. 1893-95) 
Further evidence revealed that there are approximately 
four claims offices in Utah, each handling approximately four to 
five thousand claims per year. There are scores of other claims 
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offices throughout the western states which handle a similar number 
of claims. (R. 2587-88) 
The above facts clearly demonstrate a cold, calculated 
and calloused attitude that Fire Insurance has in settling its 
claims. For this reason the trial court observed: 
[T]he issue here . . . is one that has to do 
with the wholesomeness of the warning made to 
the defendant to avoid this type of egregious 
conduct in the future and to serve as such a 
warning to others similarly situated, and I am 
not at all persuaded that this award fails to 
meet that standard. On the contrary, it 
appears to me that it will have the effect, the 
desired effect. 
(R. 2996, p. 42) 
This Court has recognized that deterrence is one of the 
primary purposes of punitive damages. Johnson v. Rogers, 
P.2d , 90 Utah Adv. Rptr. 3, 5 (Utah 1988). Only a substan-
tial amount, such as was awarded in this case, will provide the 
deterrence value necessary to effect an overhaul of Fire Insur-
ance's prevailing perspective, philosophy, and devious claims 
practices. 
6. The Relationship Between the Parties. 
As previously described, the loss payee provision in 
favor of the Bank created a fiduciary type relationship between the 
Crookstons and Fire Insurance, since Fire Insurance's negotiations 
with the Bank substantially affected the Crookston' financial 
survival. Apart from any fiduciary responsibility, insurance 
creates p. special relationship between the parties unlike most 
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commercial contracts. Historically, neighbors and communities have 
borne the consequences of a catastrophe, because of the helpless-
ness of the victims. In modern times, society's role has been 
replaced by insurance companies and society collectively pays for 
the catastrophe through premiums. 
An insurance company is required to perform under its 
contract only upon the occurrence of a loss, when an insured is 
financially and emotionally vulnerable. The more severe the loss, 
the greater the insured's helplessness and despair. The enormous 
disparity in resources between an insurance company and its 
insured, particularly in a severe loss, creates a special relation-
ship where even the hint of fraud and oppression have absolutely no 
place. 
7. The Amount Of Compensatory Damages Awarded. 
The compensatory damages awarded to the Crookstons 
(including attorneys fees and costs) have a ratio to the punitive 
damages awarded of approximately one to four. Appellant cites no 
cases to indicate that such a ratio is excessive. On the contrary, 
the Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have specifically 
approved higher ratios. For example, see Terry v. Zions 
Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) where, 
in a malicious prosecution and false imprisonment case, a ratio of 
one to six was sustained; and VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Machine 
Distributors, Inc., 758 P.2d 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), a breach of 
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contract and abuse of process case, where the court sustained a 
ratio of one to fifty. 
B. The Jury Was Appropriately Cautioned About Awarding Punitive 
Damages. 
The trial court gave precautionary jury instruction No. 
34 (R.1517) on punitive damages which stated: 
You are instructed that punitive damages 
constitute an extraordinary remedy outside the 
field of usual redress remedies which should be 
applied with caution lest, engendered by 
passion or prejudice because of a wrongdoing, 
the award becomes unrealistic or unreasonable. 
The law provides no fixed standard as to the 
amount of punitive damages, but leaves the 
amount to the jury's sound discretion, exer-
cised without passion or prejudices, however, 
the law requires that any award for such 
damages must bear a reasonable relationship to 
the actual damages. 
The jury deliberated over a day and considered all of the evidence 
and instructions, including the above caution relating to punitive 
damages. In viewing all of the evidence and circumstances of this 
case, the jury's verdict was appropriate. 
IV. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD. 
A. Fire Insurance Failed To Properly Raise The Constitutional 
Issues Below And The Court Should Not Now Consider Such Issues. 
This Court has long held that issues not presented to the 
trial court are not considered on appeal. Park City Utah Court v. 
Ensign Co. , 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978) and Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 
2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971). This rule also applies to constitu-
tional issues not involving deprivation of personal liberty. 
Pratt v. City Council of City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 
1981). Furthermore, this principle applies to review of issues 
first raised in post-trial motions. Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) and Barson v. 
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). Fire Insurance 
argues on appeal that constitutional prohibitions against excessive 
fines apply in this action and that due process guarantees require 
additional substantive and procedural protection in punitive damage 
cases. These arguments were first presented to the trial court in 
Fire Insurance's motions for new trial or judgment n.o.v. and are 
therefore not reviewable by this Court. 
1. Fire Insurance Never Sought Bifurcation Of 
The Liability And Punitive Damages Issues. 
Fire Insurance argues that due process safeguards require 
bifurcation of the liability and damage phases of the trial, citing 
its motion for separate trials. (Appendix B, R. 923-35) However, 
review of that motion and supporting memorandum (Appendix C) 
demonstrates that the relief sought in that motion is not the same 
Fire Insurance is now seeking on appeal. The Court has previously 
noted that a party cannot change the theory presented on appeal 
from that presented to the trial court. Davis v. Mulholland, 25 
Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970). 
In its motion to bifurcate, Fire Insurance requested the 
trial court to bifurcate only the first cause of action (breach of 
contract) from the remaining causes of action. (R. 931-33) Fire 
Insurance is not seeking a review of the trial court's denial of 
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that motion (which order does not appear in the record) but argues 
that the liability and punitive damage issues should have been 
bifurcated. Furthermore, the supporting memorandum is devoid of 
reference to the supposed constitutional deficiencies which Fire 
Insurance is now propounding. Since Fire Insurance did not 
affirmatively seek a bifurcation of the liability and damage issues 
on the basis of alleged constitutional infirmities before trial, 
the Court should not consider these issues now. 
2. Fire Insurance Did Not Seek a Higher 
Standard of Evidence at Trial. 
Fire Insurance asserts that the United States and Utah 
Constitutions require that an award of exemplary damages be made 
only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. The record 
amply demonstrates that Fire Insurance did not demand a higher 
standard until the hearing on its post trial motions. 
If Fire Insurance desired a higher evidentiary standard 
for the award of punitive damages, it should have raised that issue 
either by motion prior to trial, or, at the very least, when it 
submitted jury instructions to the trial court, which it did not 
do. Furthermore, and significantly, Fire Insurance's own proposed 
jury instruction—which the trial court noted as being given in 
substance—stated that the jury could award exemplary damages upon 
a preponderance of the evidence. (Appendix D, R, 1391) Since Fire 
Insurance agreed at trial that the evidentiary standard was 
preponderance of the evidence, Fire Insurance should not now be 
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permitted to repudiate its prior position and urge a higher 
standard on appeal. 
Even if one were to assume that Fire Insurance had 
properly raised this issue to the trial court, the Crookstons met 
the higher standard. The jury was instructed that it could award 
punitive damages based upon a finding of fraud, which required 
clear and convincing evidence. (Appendix E) Because the jury 
specifically found Fire Insurance's actions were fraudulent, the 
award of punitive damages met the higher standard Fire Insurance 
now advocates. 
3. Fire Insurance Did Not Raise Or Obtain A 
Ruling On The Application Of The Excessive 
Fines Clause To This Action or The 
Constitutional Standards For The Award Of 
Punitive Damages And Their Amount. 
Other than its post trial motions, the only pleadings 
Fire Insurance filed in this action which in any way referred to 
the United States or Utah Constitutions were the answer to the 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (R. 1027-1051) and its 
response to the Crookstons' trial memorandum on punitive damages 
filed June 4, 1987—the day the jury rendered its verdict. 
(Appendix G, R. 1433-1458) 
In both its Fourteenth Defense to the Crookstons' Second 
Amended Answer (Appendix F, R. 1047) and response to the 
Crookstons' trial memorandum (Appendix G), Fire Insurance cited the 
Utah and United States Constitutions only for the proposition that 
exemplary damages could not be awarded for breach of contract. 
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These references have no relationship to the constitutional 
contentions now made on appeal. In fact, awarding punitive damages 
in a contract action was a non- issue at trial and is not contested 
here since the trial court expressly instructed the jury that it 
could not award punitive damages for breach of contract or breach 
of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 1501, 
1507) 
The only reference Fire Insurance made before or during 
trial to either the Utah or United States Constitutions that could 
arguably apply outside the contract context was the following 
sentence under the heading "Historical Context" in Fire Insurance's 
trial memorandum: 
This court should give consideration to the 
constitutionality and propriety of allowing the 
jury to award punitive damages in the case at 
bar. (Appendix G, R. 1435) 
Citations to two articles followed this sentence without further 
comment. A generalized mention that the trial court should 
consider the constitutionality of allowing the award of punitive 
damages certainly did not put at issue the specific constitutional 
arguments Fire Insurance now espouses. 
Even assuming this vague reference put the matter at 
issue, Fire Insurance did not obtain a ruling which is reviewable 
on appeal. The only affirmative relief sought by Fire Insurance in 
its response to the Crookstons' trial memorandum was a ruling on a 
motion in limine with respect to the admissibility of Fire Insur-
ance's 1986 financial stat,ejjient. No reference was made in this 
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motion in limine to the constitutional issues Fire Insurance is now 
advocating. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Fire 
Insurance neither sought nor obtained a ruling on the matters 
contained in this pleading. 
The situation is thus similar to the circumstance 
encountered by the Court in Turtle Management. Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, Inc., 645 P. 2d 667 (Utah 1982) where the defendant-
appellant argued on appeal that the Court should consider some 
public policy arguments which had been stated as affirmative 
defenses in its answer to the complaint but which had never been 
argued to the trial court. In rendering its opinion, the Court 
commented: 
This Court will not consider on appeal issues 
which were not submitted to the trial court and 
concerning which the trial court did not have 
the opportunity to make any findings of fact or 
law. 
Id. at 672. The failure to obtain a ruling at trial is fatal on 
appeal even though the issues were raised but not argued until the 
hearing on motions for new trial and judgment n.o.v. 
A similar situation presented itself to the Pennsylvania 
court in Ammon v. Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 361 Pa.S. 409, 522 A.2d 
647 (1987). There, the defendant sought post trial review of a 
defense raised by motion but never heard by the trial court prior 
to the trial. The trial court sitting en banc on the post trial 
motions refused to review the issue, stating: 
A trial court en banc may not give relief on 
post-verdict motions when such relief was not 
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requested during trial. It was incumbent upon 
Schussler to pursue further relief after no 
ruling was made on his motion for judgment on 
the pleadings. For him to allow the entire 
trial to pass, without again raising the 
complete defense of general release until post-
verdict motions, results in the waiver of the 
defense. (Citations omitted) 
522 A.2d at 652. Since Fire Insurance did not raise and obtain a 
ruling on the constitutional issues prior to or during trial, it 
has waived its right of review on appeal. 
B. The Excessive Fines Clause Of The Eighth Amendment Does Not 
Apply To Civil Proceedings And Punitive Damages. 
In Ingraham v. Wright. 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401 
(1977), the United States Supreme Court devoted numerous pages of 
its opinion analyzing the history of the Eighth Amendment and found 
that its application was limited to criminal cases. Id. at 664-
669. The Court observed that all of its previous Eighth Amendment 
decisions involved criminal punishment and that in those cases 
where courts had confronted claims outside of the criminal process, 
the Eighth Amendment had been found to be inapplicable. Id. at 
667-669. 
Fire Insurance attempts to distinguish Ingraham by 
stating that the Supreme Court's lengthy analysis of the Eighth 
Amendments application was mere dicta and then argues that the 
Eighth Amendment should apply to punitive damages without citing 
any post-Ingraham case supporting its position. In fact, courts 
addressing this issue have generally held that the Eighth Amendment 
does not apply to civil cases, including punitive damages. See for 
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example, Palmer v. A.H. Robbins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 217 (Colo. 
1984) ; Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 189 
Cal. App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835, 852 (1987), cert, denied, 
108 S.Ct. 2023 (1988); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn 
Construction Co., 515 F.Supp. 64, 108-09 n. 129 (D.S.C. 1979), 
affld. mem.. 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981); Unified School Dist. No. 
490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan.2d 346, 629 P.2d 196, 206 (1981); 
United States v. Stanaland, 242 F.2d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1957); 
Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1967) cert, denied, 
389 U.S. 835, 88 S.Ct. 43 (1967). 
Fire Insurance cites only three cases in support of its 
position. All three cases were decided ]drior to Inaraham and none 
of them involved punitive damages. These cases are easily distin-
guished or are inapplicable. In Toepleman v. United States, 2 63 
F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959), the court affirmed a forfeiture under the 
Federal False Claims Act and stated in dicta that the Eighth 
Amendment may prevent an abuse of the power to punish under this 
Act. Despite this comment, the Fourth Circuit has, at least 
impliedly, overruled such dicta by affirming a trial court's 
holding that the excessive fines clause applies to criminal cases 
only. See Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Construc-
tion Co. , 515 F.Supp. 64, 108-109 n. 129 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd. 
mem., 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981). 
Fire Insurance's use of Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 92 6, 
104 N.W.2d 684 (1960) is inappropriate. In Abel, the court held a 
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statute allowing treble damages unconstitutional based on the state 
constitution, which required all penalties to be used for school 
purposes. Since Nebraska law did not permit punitive damages, any 
amount in excess of the compensatory damages would constitute a 
penalty. The statute in question allowed treble damages to be 
awarded to the injured party, and was therefore in violation of the 
state's constitution. The Eighth Amendment and excessive fines 
were not at issue. 
The final case cited by Fire Insurance, Keller v. Keller, 
52 Wash.2d 84, 323 P.2d 231 (1958), involved an appeal from a 
suspended sentence of six months in jail for contempt. In passing, 
the court commented that a trial court's discretionary powers in 
contempt proceedings may be limited by the constitutional prohibi-
tions against cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines, but 
such limitation was not at issue. Id. at 235. 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to alter its 
holding in Inaraham. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 
813, 106 S.Ct. 1580 (1986), the insurer challenged a punitive 
damage award based upon due process and other alleged constitution-
al violations. The Lavoie court reversed the judgment on other 
grounds and refused to address the constitutionality of punitive 
damages. The United States Supreme Court also granted certiorari 
in Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, U.S. , 
108 S.Ct. 1645 (1988). In this case, Banker's Life refused to pay 
disability benefits of $20,000.00 and the jury awarded 1.6 million 
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dollars in punitive damages. Banker's Life's constitutional attack 
on punitive damages closely paralleled the arguments advanced and 
authorities cited by Fire Insurance in the present case. Just as 
Fire Insurance has done in this case, Banker's Life failed to 
properly raise the constitutional arguments in the trial court, and 
the United States Supreme Court refused to address the constitu-
tional issues. 
Since issuing the Banker's Life decision, the United 
States Supreme Court has denied petitions for writ of certiorari in 
numerous cases challenging the constitutionality of exceptionally 
high punitive damage awards, ranging in size up to ten million 
dollars. In Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n, 
189 Cal.App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1987) cert, denied, 
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 2023 (1988), the Court refused to 
consider an appeal from a five million dollar punitive damage award 
based upon the insurance company's "bad faith." The California 
Appellate Court had considered the constitutionality issue and had 
ruled that the Eighth Amendment applied only to criminal actions 
and that the punitive damage award was not an excessive fine, even 
though the fine under the criminal code for similar conduct would 
have been only $500.00. 234 Cal. Rptr. at 851. 
In O'Gilvie v. International Platex, Inc., 609 F.Supp. 
817 (D.Kan. 1985), mod. 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied. U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 2014 (1988), the 
Supreme Court refused to consider a constitutional challenge to a 
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$10 million punitive damage award in a case involving toxic shock 
syndrome. For similar rulings see Atlantic Richfield v. Nielsen, 
unpublished opinion, Civil No. 473779, Superior Ct. San Diego 
County, Calif., Appeal No. 003945, Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. (Jl. 6, 
1987, mod. Jl. 31, 1987), cert, denied, U.S. 
108 S.Ct. 2023 (1988), where 3.5 million dollars was awarded in 
punitive damages for intentional concealments; National Life & 
Accident Insurance Co. v. Miller, 484 So.2d 329 (Miss. 1985), cert. 
denied, U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 2007 (1988) based upon a 
bad faith claim resulting in an award of $2,500.00 actual damages 
and $350,000.00 punitive damages; Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Campbell, 
485 So.2d 312 (Ala. 1986) cert, denied, U.S. , 
108 S.Ct. 2007 (1988), relating to intentional misrepresentations 
about a condition of a vehicle, resulting in an award of 
$350,000.00; Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of America, 731 P.2d 1267 
(Idaho 1986) cert, denied, U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 2013, 
(1988) where defendants were assessed $300,000.00 in punitive 
damages resulting from an exploding bottle cap; and Ramsey 
Associates, Inc. v. Coty, 546 A.2d 196 (Vt. 1988) cert, denied, 
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 2903 (1988) where 
$388,000.00 in punitive damages were assessed against the defendant 
for maliciously establishing a pig farm next to plaintiff's motel 
(the Vermont Supreme Court expressly held that the Eighth Amendment 
applied only to criminal penalties). 
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Even if this Court were to assume that Fire Insurance 
properly raised in the trial court a constitutional challenge based 
upon the Eighth Amendment, there is no sound case precedent for its 
position. In any event, the punitive damages awarded in this case 
were not excessive under the circumstances, as discussed above. 
Co Fire Insurance Has Not Been Denied Due Process. 
1. Punitive Damages Are a Necessary Component 
of Civil Law. 
Punitive damages serve an indispensible social function. 
First, they punish injurious behavior which is not criminal but is 
nonetheless motivated by malice or reckless disregard for the 
rights of others, thereby marking the outer limits of socially 
acceptable behavior. Second, they impose a punishment commensurate 
to the egregiousness of the conduct as well as the damage to the 
particular victim, thereby taking the profit out of wrongful 
conduct. Third, they warn other potential wrongdoers that society 
does not tolerate unacceptable behaviors, thereby deterring future 
anti-social conduct. Fourth, they provide incentives for civil 
enforcement of society's norms, thereby multiplying the potential 
for improved social responsibility. Fifth, they provide an avenue 
to express society's outrage, thereby discouraging private ven-
geance. 
Punitive damages are undeniably a powerful tool in 
controlling anti-social conduct. Mailer & Roberts, "Punitive 
Damages: Toward a Principled Approach," 31 Hast L.J. 639, 643-650 
(1980). 
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2. Fire Insurance Failed to Propose an Alter-
native Standard for the Award of Punitive 
Damages. 
The trial court instructed the jury on the standard for 
the award of punitive damages in Instruction No. 3 3 (Appendix H). 
This was the same standard proposed by Fire Insurance. (Appendix 
D) . Furthermore, the trial court gave a precautionary instruction 
on punitive damages. (Appendix I, R. 1517). Now dissatisfied with 
the verdict, Fire Insurance asserts that the very standards it 
proposed to the trial court were too vague and violated due 
process. 
On appeal, Fire Insurance is highly critical of punitive 
damages claiming that they are based upon vague and unclear 
standards. Yet, with the exception of advocating a higher standard 
of proof, Fire Insurance proposes no alternative standard or basis 
for the award of punitive damages. 
3. The Trial Court Gave the Jury Sufficient 
Instruction. 
The basis for much of the popular criticism against 
punitive damage relates to the vagueness of the standards for the 
award. For example, critics complain that in some states (1) there 
is no relationship between the amount of punitive damages and 
compensatory damages or (2) punitive damages may be recovered for 
gross negligence. See Schmidt v. American Leasco, 139 Ariz. 509, 
679 P. 2d 532, 535 (1983) (jury allowed to award punitive damages 
without consideration of compensatory damages) and Valdez v. 
Cillessen & Son, Inc.. 105 N.M. 575, 734 P.2d 1258 (1987) (punitive 
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damages in case of gross negligence). Utah is unlike those states 
having such vague standards. The trial judge here instructed the 
jury that the punitive damage award must bear some reasonable 
relationship to the compensatory award: 
The law provides no fixed standard as to the 
amount of punitive damages, but leaves the 
amount to the jury's sound discretion, exer-
cised without passion or prejudice, however, 
the law requires that any award for such 
damages must bear a reasonable relationship to 
the actual damages. 
(Appendix I) Furthermore, the jury was instructed that it could 
award punitive damages only if Fire Insurance acted intentionally 
with malice or in reckless disregard of the Crookstons' rights. 
(Appendix H) 
Allowing a jury the discretion to determine the amount of 
damages when given judicial guidelines does not violate due 
process. A jury expresses the conscience of the community. 
Witherspoon v. Illinois. 391 U.S. 510, 519, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1775 
(1968). Unduly restricting a jury's discretion in awarding damages 
would essentially deny a party's right to jury trial. Community 
values cannot be reduced to a formula without affecting the jury 
system: 
. . . [T]he inherent lack of predictability of 
jury decisions does not justify their condemna-
tion. On the contrary, it is the jury's 
function to make the difficult and uniquely 
human judgments that defy codification and that 
nbuil[d] discretion, equity and flexibility 
into a legal system. 
McCleskv v. Kemp. 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1777 (1987). 
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Fire Insurance argues that criminal standards should 
apply to punitive damage cases. Yet, criminal standards are not as 
rigid as Fire Insurance seems to imply. First, a wrongdoer has no 
right under the due process clause to know with certainty the cost 
of his misconduct. See Smith v. Wade. 461 U.S. 30, 50, 103 S.Ct. 
1625 (1983). Second, the law accords the trial court discretion in 
sentencing. See for example, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 
96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 et. sea. (1988 
Supp.). Finally, the flexibility given a jury allows individual-
ized punishment commensurate with the reprehensibility of defen-
dant's conduct and with his wealth. As Blackstone noted in 1768: 
The quantum, in particular of pecuniary fines 
neither can, nor ought to be, ascertained by 
any invariable law. The value of money itself 
changes from a thousand causes; and, at all 
events, what is ruin to one man's fortune, may 
be a matter of indifference to anothers . . . . 
Our statute law has not therefore often 
ascertained the quantity of fines, nor the 
common law ever. 
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, 377-78 (1768). 
4. Criminal and Civil Penalties Are Complementary 
But Not Interchangeable. 
Fire Insurance suggests that the punitive damage award is 
excessive in light of Utah statute which provides for a fine of 
$10,000.00 for corporate misconduct. Such a comparison fails for 
many reasons. First, Fire Insurance fails to consider that there 
are numerous punishments under the criminal code that would relate 
to corporate misconduct. For example, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(2) (1988 Supp.) a court has authority, in ciddition to imposing 
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fines, to dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license or 
impose any other civil penalty. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303 
(as amended), a court can require appropriate publicity of criminal 
conviction and can force the removal of a managerial or executive 
officer of a corporation for up to five years. Further, under Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1602(ppp) and § 76-10-1603.5(5) (1988 Supp.), 
the court can impose restrictions upon a corporation's activities 
and can even order the dissolution or reorganization of the 
corporation. In addition to the above, the insurance commissioner 
may revoke, suspend or refuse to renew an insurer's license or 
certificate of authority because of violations under the Claims 
Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301 et seq. (as amended) . 
See also Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-308 (10) , (11), and (12) effective 
through December 31, 1987 (as amended) . tn light of all of these 
penal remedies, the punitive damage award in this case is not 
disproportionate. 
Second, criminal and civil penalties have historically 
worked hand in hand to punish and deter wrongful conduct. The 
legislature has expressly recognized treble damages in addition to 
criminal penalties for certain wrongful conduct. See for example 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-919(1)(b) (as amended). The legislature 
expressly recognized this concept in § 76-3-201(2) (1988 Supp.) 
which states: 
This chapter [sentencing] does not deprive a 
court of authority conferred by law to . . . 
impose any other civil penalty. 
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See also Johnson v. Rogers, P.2d _ , 90 Utah Adv. 
Rptr. 3, 4-5 (1988) where this Court expressly endorsed punitive 
damages in addition to the defendant's criminal penalties; United 
States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 304-05, 67 
S.Ct. 677, 702 (1947) where the Court held that a fine of 
$700,000.00 would not be excessive punishment even though the 
maximum criminal fine for the underlying conduct was only 
$5,000.00; and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 104 
S.Ct. 615 (1984) where the Court considered whether a 
$10,000,000.00 punitive damage award was preempted by a federal law 
authorizing a maximum civil fine for such conduct of $25,000.00. 
Justice Powell in his dissent argued that by establishing the 
maximum fine, congress intended thereby to achieve both punishment 
and deterrence. A majority of the court rejected this view 
recognizing that a large punitive damage award compliments a 
smaller prescribed fine, stating: "The award of punitive damages 
in the present case does not conflict11 with the federal remedial 
scheme. 464 U.S. at 257. 
Third, Fire Insurance's analysis fails to recognize that 
using criminal penalties for measuring punitive damages is unwork-
able. For individual defendants, imprisonment as well as fines are 
a part of the criminal penalty. How can one equate punitive 
damages to the loss of freedom? As described above, there are 
numerous criminal penalties available to the court such as negative 
publicity about the conviction, restriction of business activities, 
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restraining orders, revoking licenses, and reorganization or 
dissolution of a corporation. How can a punitive damage award be 
compared to these penal remedies? Is there some monetary value for 
the stigma of criminal conviction or the loss of voting rights and 
other rights that a criminal penalty would entail? Another problem 
with this approach is determining what criminal action, if any, is 
analogous to the defendant's wrongful conduit. 
A defendant such as Fire Insurance can gain enormous 
profits by engaging in wrongful conduct where there is little 
likelihood of criminal prosecution. The prospect of an occasional 
and relatively modest financial penalty will not deter such 
conduct. 
After careful analysis of Fire Insurance's position, it 
is easy to see why courts have refused to accept the arguments Fire 
Insurance has advanced. The civil and criminal systems play 
important, but different, roles in regulating undesirable social 
behavior. The Crookstons maintain that the present system need not 
be altered and there are sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse.3 
JThe extensive criticism of punitive damage awards getting out 
of hand does not appear to have the empirical foundation to support 
the critical generalities. See for example, Johnston, "Punitive 
Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law," 87 
Col.L.Rev. 1385, 1387 n. 8 (1987), the author states that an 
American Bar Foundation study "sharply contradicts the impression 
given by anecdotal evidence that staggering punitive damages are 
frequently awarded."; and Prentice, "Reforming Punitive Damages: 
The Judicial Bargaining Concept," 7 Rev. Litigation, 113, 123, 
(1988) where the author states, "No doubt there is some substance 
to these claims, though the reports of a litigation explosion, like 
Mark Twain's death, have been greatly exaggerated, and the insur-
ance crisis is, at least in part, an invention of the insurance 
industry." 
If reform in the area of punitive damage is needed, such should not 
be done by the judiciary. 
5. Any Change in the Law of Punitive Damages 
Should Be Accomplished Through Legislation. 
Punitive damages are so intertwined with the civil and 
criminal systems that judicial reform on a case by case basis over 
a period of many years is not a workable approach. The legislature 
can balance the competing interests, addressing both tort and 
criminal reform, since adjusting punitive damages may also require 
an adjustment to the penal system. Legislators have not been 
inactive on this issue. In the past two years, the Utah Legisla-
ture has passed major tort reform legislation and the 1988 legisla-
ture formed a Joint Committee on Tort and Insurance Reform to make 
recommendations on subjects including punitive damages. A change, 
if needed, is best handled by legislation. 
V. THE CROOKSTONS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES 
AND THE AMOUNT AWARDED BY THE COURT WAS BASED 
UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. Attorneys' Fees Are Awardable In Actions For Fraud And Bad 
Faith. 
The jury found Fire Insurance liable to the Crookstons 
for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and bad 
faith. After the jury had been dismissed, the trial court con-
cluded that the Crookstons were entitled to attorneys fees: 
It is my view in light of the verdict that has 
been returned to this court by the jury, that 
attorney's fees are awardable under the 
intentional tort causes of action, which have 
been determined favorably to the plaintiffs. 
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(R. 2742) . The trial court's ruling that Crookstons are entitled 
to attorney's fees was based on this Court's decision in American 
States Insurance Co, v. Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042, 1044 
(1971) wherein the Court stated: 
Before an award of attorney's fee could be made 
in the declaratory judgment action, it must 
appear that the insurance company acted in bad 
faith or fraudulently or was stubbornly 
litigious. 
Although the trial court expressly awarded attorneys fees 
on the basis of fraud, the trial court's decision is additionally 
supportable on the bad faith claim. This Court has previously 
noted that: 
The appellate court will affirm the judgment, 
order, or decree appealed from if it is sus-
tainable on any legal ground or theory apparent 
on the record, even though such ground or 
theory differs from that stated by the trial 
court to be the basis of its ruling or action . 
(Goodsel v. Department of Business 
Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974) 
(quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1464(1)). 
In Beck, supra, the Court recognized that a breach of an insurer's 
implied duty of good faith could result in foreseeable consequen-
tial damages including attorneys fees necessary to pursue the 
insured's claim. Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed the prin-
ciple. See, Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 
746 P.2d 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) and Zions First National Bank 
v. National American Title Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988). 
B. The Trial Court's Award Was Based On Substantial Evidence And 
Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion. 
This Court has previously held that, "The award of 
attorney,s fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court and 
will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse 
of that discretion." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 
1982). Fire Insurance claims that Judge Frederick abused his 
discretion, citing Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 
657 P. 2d 1279 (Utah 1982) and Sharp v. Hui Wahine, Inc. . 49 Haw. 
241, 413 P.2d 242 (1966). Although these two cases state valid 
principles, neither is applicable to this case. 
In Mueller, two plaintiffs had failed in their claims and 
the defendant was awarded attorneys fees. The trial court divided 
the responsibility for payment of fees equally between the two 
plaintiffs on the basis of an off-hand comment made by the attorney 
for the defendant that he had worked about equally defending 
against the two plaintiffs7 claims. The trial court ignored the 
stipulated detailed billing records which had been submitted to the 
court for its review. On appeal, this Court reiterated its prior 
holdings that in order for the award to be reasonable it must be 
based on evidence, citing Sharp. 
In Sharp, the Hawaii Supreme Court overturned the award 
of attorney's fees awarded in a foreclosure action. In that case, 
counsel for the prevailing party claimed that a 15 percent contin-
gency fee was reasonable per se and failed to present any evidence 
as to the amount of work which the attorney had actually invested 
in the case. The Hawaii court held that the trial court could not 
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award attorney's fees on counsel's self-serving opinion. The Sharp 
case does not stand for the proposition that an attorney cannot 
testify concerning facts material to the work he performed and the 
factors relevant to the award of a reasonable attorneys fee. 
In awarding the fee in this case, the trial court was 
guided by the factors set forth in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 
622 (Utah 1985). There, the Court stated: 
Reasonable attorneys fees are not measured by 
what an attorney actually bills, nor is the 
number of hours spent on a case determinative 
in computing fees. In determining the reason-
ableness of attorney's fees, a trial judge may 
take into account the provision in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility which specifies the 
elements that should be considered in setting 
reasonable attorneys fees* Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility DR 2-106. A court 
may consider, among other factors, the diffi-
culty of the litigation, the efficiency of the 
attorneys in presenting the case, the reason-
ableness of the number of hours spent on the 
case, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services, the amount 
involved in the case and the result attained, 
and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved. 
Id. at 624-625. In support of the Crookstons' claim for attorney's 
fees, counsel for the Crookstons, L. Rich Humpherys, submitted an 
affidavit stating facts relevant to the criteria set forth in 
Cabrera and attached thereto a detailed description of the work and 
accounting of the time spent in pursuing the Crookstons' case. (R. 
2773-2800) In addition, counsel for Fire Insurance took Mr. 
Humpherys' deposition, cross-examining Mr. Humpherys on the details 
of the statements made in his affidavit. (R. 2997) After consi-
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dering the affidavit, the deposition, and the oral argument 
presented by counsel, the trial court issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (Appendix J, R. 2964-67) 
These findings of fact and conclusions of law were not 
based upon mere speculative opinion. Mr. Humpherys fully detailed 
the number of hours worked on the case, the experience he had had 
in pursuing these types of cases, and the loss of business which he 
had incurred as a result of pursuing this claim. The trial court 
was aware of the size of the award and the complexities of the 
case. The trial court was fully advised as to all the factors to 
be considered and based on the evidence presented rendered his 
decision concerning the fees. The case is not remotely similar to 
the Mueller or Sharp cases where the fee awards were based merely 
on off-hand comments of counsel not based on pertinent facts. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse his discretion, and the 
award should stand. 
C. Fire Insurance Has Waived Its Right To Contest The Number Of 
Hours Devoted To The Case. 
On December 14, 1987, the trial court heard oral argument 
on post trial motions including the Crookstons' motion for the 
award of attorney's fees. (R. 2996) During the course of that 
argument, counsel for Fire Insurance made the following statement: 
Insofar as the attorney's fees are concerned, 
your Honor, what I elicited in that deposition 
was that Mr. Humpherys and Mr. Klemm had 
approximately 1,000 hours and I tell Mr. 
Humpherys and I represent to the Court that we 
do not quarrel with the amount of time repre-
sented in that bill. 
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(Record 2996 p. 34) After the trial court had taken the motion 
under advisement, counsel for Fire Insurance forwarded a letter to 
the court in which counsel made the statement, "We do not quarrel 
with the amount of time expended by Mr. Humpherys." (R. 2958) 
Fire Insurance now contends that a portion of the time on 
the billing summary submitted to the tri^l court was attributable 
to claims against Rocky Mountain State Bank and that the time is 
not appropriately chargeable to Fire Insurance. This is a conten-
tion being raised for the first time on appeal and under well 
settled rules of appellate review should not be addressed by the 
Court. Hansen v. Gossett, 590 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1979). 
Even if this Court were disposed to consider the claimed 
impropriety, it appears that the trial court has already addressed 
the issue. The Crookstons' motion for attorney7s fees requested an 
award of $200,000.00. (R. 2771) The trial court reduced the 
requested amount by $25,000.00 or approximately one-eighth. This 
roughly equates with the time attributable to the Rocky Mountain 
State Bank claim reflected on the billing summary submitted by Mr. 
Humpherys to the trial court. Since the trial court reduced the 
requested award, Fire Insurance's contention that excessive 
attorney's fees were awarded is not well taken. 
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VI. THE CROOKSTONS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY CONTRACTUAL 
LIMITATION. 
A. Contractual Limitations Do Not Apply To Tort Claims. 
The very terms of the limitation confine its application 
to actions "on the policy." In construing similar limitation 
provisions, courts have held that these limitations do not bar tort 
claims. See, for example, Asher v. Reliance Insurance Co., 3 08 
F.Supp. 847 (N.D.Cal. 1970) and Davis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co. , 545 F.Supp. 370 (D.Nev. 1982). Accordingly, the policy 
limitation has no bearing or effect on the jury's findings that 
Fire Insurance Exchange defrauded and intentionally inflicted 
emotional distress upon the Crookstons. 
B. The Policy Limitation Does Not Bar The Crookstons7 Claim Of 
Bad Faith. 
1. The Limitation Is Unenforceable As A Matter 
Of Common Law. 
This Court has at times upheld contractual limitations in 
the absence of extenuating circumstances; however, it has also 
strongly expressed its view that such limitations are " . . . looked 
upon with disfavor." Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
583 P.2d 101, 103 (Utah 1978). Although the Court has not hereto-
fore considered the enforceability of a contractual limitation when 
interposed as a defense to insurer bad faith, it has cited cases 
wherein the insureds bad faith rendered the limitation unenforce-
able and announced principles pertaining thereto. 
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In Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co,, 595 P.2d 
863 (Utah 1979), the Court held that an insurance company's failure 
to deliver a copy of an insurance policy to its insured precluded 
the insurer from relying on a contractual limitation, citing 
Lanier v. Coastal States Life Insurance Co, , 106 Ga. App. 802, 128 
S.Eo2d 550 (1962). In Lanier, the Georgia court noted that 
although mere failure to pay a claim would not be sufficient to 
waive a contractual limitation, something more, such as an act 
which gave evidence that the insurer was not fulfilling its 
obligation of utmost fair dealing, would render the limitation 
unenforceable• 
In Beck, supra, the Court upheld the validity of a cause 
of action for first party bad faith and outlined the elements of 
the cause of action and its remedies. During the discussion, the 
Court cited Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 53 N.J. 
313, 250 A.2d 580 (1969), a case specifically treating the enforce-
ability of a statute of limitations in an action for bad faith. In 
Bowler, a disability insurer without just cause terminated dis-
ability benefits to the insured, an unschooled individual. When 
the insured filed an action on the policy, the insurer defended on 
the applicable limitations statute. 
While considering the insurer's claim that the cause of 
action was barred, the New Jersey court noted that insurers enjoy 
many privileges under the law and have an obligation to deal fairly 
with their insureds. Furthermore, the court observed that insur-
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ance policies are prepared by the company's experts and that there 
is no arms length bargaining which characterizes negotiations 
between equals in the market place. Thereafter, the court stated 
that, "[t]he slightest evidence of deception or overreaching will 
bar reliance upon time limitations for prosecution of the claim," 
and that "conduct incompatible with the insurer's obligation to 
exercise good faith in dealing with its insured [in] and of itself 
creates an equitable estoppel against the plea of the statute of 
limitations." [Emphasis by the court]. Id. at 588, 589. For 
additional cases with similar holdings, see Diamon v. Penn Mutual 
Fire Insurance Co., 247 Pa.S. 534, 372 A.2d 1218 (1977) and Leone 
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 599 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
While this Court in Beck did not cite Bowler for the 
precise issue at bar, Bowler is consistent with principles announ-
ced in Beck. The Court stated in footnote 4 that: 
The duty to perform the contract in good faith 
cannot, by definition, be waived by either 
party to the agreement. 
Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. The Court subsequently alluded to the non-
waiverability of the implied duty of good faith in Zions First 
National Bank v. National American Title Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1988) . There, the Court observed that attorneys fees 
would be available to an insured in an action for breach of the 
duty of good faith despite contrary policy provisions because the 
implied duty of good faith was non-waiverable through contract. 
Similarly, Fire Insurance Exchange's policy provision ostensibly 
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limiting pursuit of a bad faith claim to a period much shorter than 
that otherwise mandated by statute constitutes an impermissible 
attempt by Fire Insurance to contractually limit its implied duty 
of good faith. 
2. The Policy Provision Is Unenforceable As A 
Matter Of Utah Statute. 
Fire Insurance argues that its one year limitation was 
permitted by Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-19 (1953) [repealed]. Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1986), which repealed the prior statute, 
restricts a contractual limitation in an insurance policy to a 
period not less than three years. Under Utah law, a limitation 
does not affect the claim or cause of action but only the remedy. 
Rhoades v. Wright. 622 P.2d 343, 350 (Utah 1980); cert, denied, 454 
U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 397 (1981). Since a limitation only prevents 
one from pursuing his claim, the limitation is "procedural" and not 
"substantive." Rhoades. 622 P.2d at 349. 
The Court has held that procedural statutes enacted after 
a suit has been commenced apply not only to future actions, but 
also to pending actions as well. Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick 
Brady Systems. Inc.. 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1986) and State Department 
of Social Services v. Higgs. 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982). Since the 
procedural law permitting a one-year limitation has been replaced 
with a statute disallowing any limitation less than three years, 
the three-year limitation now applies and Crookstons' filing was 
timely. 
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3. The Crookstons Timely Filed Under Statutory 
Tolling Provisions. 
a. The Crookstons had until January, 1984 to file 
this action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 
(1987). 
Even if the one-year limitation is valid, the Crookstons 
timely filed this action. On September 27, 1982, within one year 
of the loss, the Crookstons filed a complaint with the Utah 
Insurance Department asserting that Fire Insurance had breached the 
contract and acted in bad faith in adjusting the loss. (Appendix 
K, Ex. 9, pp. 24-27) Fire Insurance replied in writing on November 
2, 1982. (Appendix L, Ex. 9, pp. 28-31) In January, 1983, 13 
months after the loss, the insurance depcirtment notified the 
Crookstons that it would not be able to pursue their complaint and 
recommended that they file a civil action. (Appendix M, Ex. 9, p. 
32) The Crookstons promptly filed the present action on February 
10, 1982. (R. 22-28) 
Utah statute specifically provides for a situation where 
an aggrieved party acts within the limitation period to seek relief 
but the system rejects the complaint based on reasons other than 
the merits. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1987) states in relevant 
part: 
If any action is commenced within due time and 
a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than 
upon the merits, and the time limited either by 
law or contract for commencing the same shall 
have expired, the plaintiff . . . may commence 
a new action within one year after the reversal 
or failure. [Emphasis added.] 
Since the Utah State Insurance Department's refusal to act was not 
an adjudication on the merits, the Crookstons had one year from the 
receipt of the Insurance Department's notification to file another 
complaint and the February filing of this action was timely. 
A contrary position under these circumstances would be 
against sound policy. The law favors alternative dispute resolu-
tion such as administrative action, arbitration, mediation, etc. 
If the tolling statute is inapplicable, an insured would be 
required to file an action to protect against the running of the 
contractual limitation, regardless of any pending alternative 
dispute resolution proceedings. Consequently, if the insured did 
not file an action, an insurer would have an incentive to delay 
alternative dispute proceedings. Once the matter was not resolved 
within one year of the loss, the insurer could then assert the 
limitation defense. In the meantime, the insured would be under 
the false impression that his or her rights were protected because 
the claim was being pursued. This is clearly undesirable. 
b. The Crookstons had until June 16, 1983 to file 
this action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 
(1987). 
Fire Insurance made payment under the policy on June 16, 
1982. The Exchange's payment brought into play the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1987), which state in relevant part: 
In any case founded on contract, when any part 
of the principal or interest shall have been 
paid, . . . an action may be brought within the 
period prescribed for the same after such 
payment . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
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Under this statute the Crookstons had one year from the payment on 
June 16, 1982 to file their action. Accordingly, their complaint 
filed on February 10, 1983 was timely. 
VII. FIRE INSURANCE WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY EITHER THE 
DISMISSAL OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK OR THE 
JUDGE'S DENIAL OF FIRE INSURANCE'S MOTION TO 
CONTINUE. 
A. Fire Insurance Had No Vested Right To Have Rocky Mountain 
State Bank Joined In The Trial Of Crookstons' Action Against Fire 
Insurance. 
A tort-feasor does not have an absolute right to have all 
potential joint tort-feasors joined in an action. Fire Insurance's 
position on this issue is similar to that taken by a tort-feasor in 
Cruz v. Montoya. 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983). There, a defendant 
claimed on appeal that he had been prejudiced by the fact that he 
had to answer not only for his own acts but also for the acts of 
defendants who had been dismissed from the action. This Court 
rejected the defendant's argument stating that the contribution 
statute did not require the injured party to include all joint 
tort-feasors in the action. Furthermore, the Court noted that the 
number of tort-feasors brought to trial did not diminish the damage 
suffered by plaintiff or the defendant's liability for assault. 
The same is true in this action. 
It may ultimately be determined that Fire Insurance has a 
claim in contribution against the Bank. However, that does not 
negate the jury's finding that Fire Insurance wrongfully injured 
the Crookstons. 
84 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Refusing To Grant A Contin-
uance . 
At the time of trial, this case had been pending for more 
than four years. Fire Insurance had the entire time to prepare its 
case and to gather all evidence of the Bank's wrongful actions. 
Indeed, the trial court allowed Fire Insurance to present all of 
its evidence concerning the Bank's activities and to argue that the 
Crookstons' damages resulted from the Bank's actions. The court 
also instructed the jury in Instructions 25 and 37 (R. 1506, 1520) 
that they could award damages only for injuries caused by Fire 
Insurance. The Bank was not present at trial to contest Fire 
Insurance's assertions. What more would the Bank's presence add in 
Fire Insurance's favor? If a party at trial, the Bank would have 
denied responsibility and directed blame back at Fire Insurance. 
Fire Insurance was therefore not prejudiced. 
The ruling on a motion to continue lies in the trial 
court's discretion and this Court does not reverse the ruling 
absent a showing that the trial court has abused its discretion. 
Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962). A review-
ing court will not interfere with matters of discretion ". . . 
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess of its 
authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason that its action 
must be deemed capricious and arbitrary." Peatross v. Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976). 
There is nothing in the record here which even hints that the trial 
court's denial of the motion was outside reason or capricious. 
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C. The Crookstons Would Be Seriously Prejudiced If This Court 
Remands On This Issue, 
On August 28, 1987, Utah's Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions took possession of the Bank due to the Bank's insol-
vency. (See Order Approving Possession, in the Matter of Posses-
sion of Rocky Mountain State Bank by Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions, Civil No. C87-5743, Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, attached hereto as Appendix N) . 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-1(1), (1988) all actions against the 
Bank are stayed unless expressly permitted by the court. In said 
insolvency proceedings, the trial court denied Fire Insurance's 
motion to lift the stay on May 16, 1988. (Appendix 0) Fire 
Insurance then appealed the court's denial, which appeal was 
dismissed by this court on August 18, 1988. (Appendix P) The 
stay, therefore, remains in effect. 
In light of the above circumstances, it is presently 
impossible to have a retrial with the Bank as a party. Therefore, 
a remand on this issue for a new trial is improper. Even if the 
stay were lifted, said insolvency proceedings, with the unique law 
and procedures relating thereto, would seriously complicate, delay 
and prejudice the Crookstons' claim. 
VIII. THE COURT'S COMMENT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Fire Insurance itself admits that the trial court's 
comment was insufficient to merit reversal. The measure of whether 
a trial judge's remarks constitute error was alluded to in Bennett 
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v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc.. 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 
(1966). There, the Court examined the comments of a trial judge in 
context and evaluated the likelihood that the result would have 
been different in absence of the remarks. The Arizona Supreme 
Court articulated this standard in Jones v. Munn, 140 Ariz. 216, 
681 P.2d 368, 373 (1984) as follows: 
To constitute a comment on the evidence, the 
court must express an opinion as to what the 
evidence shows or what it does not show. 
Inferences to be derived from the evidence are 
within the sole province of the jury. However, 
a case will not be reversed unless the comment 
prejudiced the party who opposed it, and the 
test for determining prejudice is whether there 
is a reasonable probability a different verdict 
might have been reached if the error had not 
occurred. [Citations omitted.] 
Measured against this standard, Judge Frederick's comment 
certainly does not constitute prejudicial error. There is no 
reasonable likelihood that the judge's innocuous jest that he would 
affirm the proposition that educated people are sometimes finan-
cially illiterate would have changed the outcome at all. Further-
more, in Instruction No. 7 (R. 1483) the trial court carefully 
instructed the jury not to consider any comment by the court which 
might indicate any opinion about the merits of either party's 
position. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Crookstons' home collapsed on December 2, 1981. By 
July, 1982, they had lost everything and filed bankruptcy. The 
Crookstons and their creditors remain uncompensated and the 
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bankruptcy case remains open. Fire Insurance has paid nothing 
since the settlement with the Bank on June 16, 1982. It is time 
this litigation ends; if not, justice may be found only on paper. 
Crookstons respectfully submit that the judgments below 
be affirmed. Since attorneys fees and costs are awardable under 
the jury's verdict, Crookstons further seek attorneys fees and 
costs incurred in this appeal. 
DATED this 21st day of October 1988. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By'*£/- ^/^*&ffo*&^^**'~i 
£?&* Rich Humpherys 
M. Douglas Bayly^ 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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This is to certify that on this ^V day of October, 
1988, four true and correct copies of Respondent's Brief were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Frank A. Roybal 
422 North Main Street 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
and four true and correct copies were hand delivered to: 
Philip R. Fishier 
Steven J. Trayner 
STRONG & HANNI 
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THE PARTIES AND WITNESSES 
LARRY & RANDI CROOKSTON - Plaintiffs and Respondents 
A. Fact Witnesses 
1. Ralph Klemm - Crookston's Attbrney 
2. Rex Stailings - Independent Contractor who 
submitted a bid for $49,600 
3. Kyle Brewster - original Builder who submitted 
a bid for $50,951 
4. Jimmie Jones - original Architect who submitted 
a bid for $74,^)00 
5. Argen Jager - purchased Crookstonfs home from 
Bank and rebuiljt 
B. Bankruptcy Witnesses 
1. Phillip Harding - Crookston's Attorney 
2. Anna Drake - Trustee of Crookston's Estate 
C. Expert Witnesses 
1. Milton Beck - Adjustor for 22 years - claims 
procedures) 
2. Paul Randle - Professor of Finances, Economist 
and Insurance Expert 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE - Defendant and Appellant 
A. Employee Witnesses 
1. Denton Moser - Adjuster 
2. Alan Clapperton - Adjuster 
3. Kent Soderguist - Supervisor 
B. Other Witnesses 
1. Steven Phipps - Contractor who submitted a bid for 
$27,830 
2• Kent Rich - Engineer retained by Fire Insurance 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK- Kraig Murdock - Bank Officer 
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FRANK A. ROYBAL [A2816] 
Attorney for Defendant 
Fire Insurance Exchange 
442 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone:[801]292-1483 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON & RANDI L, 
CROOKSTON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 





JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H. 
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE'S MOTION FOR 
SEPARATE TRIALS 
Civil No. C83-1030 











COMES NOW the above-named defendant, FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, a reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, by and 
through its attorney, FRANK A. ROYBAL, in the above-entitled 
and numbered matter and hereby respectfully moves the court 
for an order of separate trials of certain claims against 
this defendant set forth in Plaintiffs1 First Amended Complaint 
upon the grounds that separate trials (a) will be in further-
ance of convenience, (b) prejudice will thus be avoided, 
(c) will be conducive to judicial economy and (d) for reasons 
stated in Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Memorandum Of 
Points And Authorities In Support Of Motion For Separate Trials, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated [1953] , as amended. 
-3-
Therefore, it would be appropriate for an order directing 
separate trials of certain issues against this defendant. 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J'LYNNE H. WOLFLEY, hereby certify that on the 
10th day of December, 1986, a copy of the foregoing Defendant 
Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion For Separate Trials was 
properly mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys at Law 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Francis M. Wikstrom 
Daniel W. Hindert 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys at Law 
185 South State Street 
Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carmen E. Kipp 
Karen J. McClurg 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Melvin G. Larew, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
1095 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
^3>* t.-J 
-4 
Stephen G. Morgan 
John E. Hansen 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John M. Chipman 
Andrea C. Alcabes 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys at Law 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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FRANK A. ROYBAL [A2816] 
Attorney for Defendant 
Fire Insurance Exchange 
442 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84 010 
Telephone: [801]292-1483 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON & RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 





JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H. 
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE'S MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SEPARATE TRIALS 
Civil No. C83-1030 











STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The material facts relevant to this action are as 
follows: 
1. That plaintiffs entered into a written Proposal 
and Contract with third-party defendant KYLE H. BREWSTER "to 
build a residence . . . in accordance with the plans and 
specifications prepared by Jimmy Jones, architect," dated 
October 27, 1980, in the City of North Salt Lake, County of 
Davis, State of Utah. 
2. That defendant FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE issued 
to plaintiffs a standard home owner's insurance policy no. 
76 6076 00 92, dated December 4, 1980. 
2. That on or about December 11, 198 0, defendant 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK agreed to make a construction loan 
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to plaintiffs for said residence. That some time during the 
month of January, 1981, construction commenced on an "earth 
home" and was partially completed during the year 1981, and 
on or about December 2, 1981, the home collapsed. 
4. That pursuant to the contractual provisions con-
tained in said insurance policy, on June 16, 1982, defendant 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE paid defendant ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE 
BANK the sum of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR 
DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-SIX CENTS [$32,744.76] for said loss. 
5. That as appears from the pleadings herein, Plain-
tiff1 First Amended Complaint-raised nine [9] causes of action, 
six [6] of which are directed against defendant FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE. Plaintiffs1 "First Cause Of Action" alleges Breach 
of Contract, the remaining causes of action are predicated in 
part or entirely as alleged consequences that resulted from 
the alleged breach of contract. 
6. That plaintiffs alleged in the "Second Cause 
Of Action" Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 
"Fifth Cause Of Action" Acting in Concert; "Sixth Cause Of 
Action" Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; "Eighth 
Cause Of Action" Liability for Intentional Consequences; and 
in the "Ninth Cause Of Action" Liability for Tortious Conduct. 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SEPARATE TRIALS HEARD BY THE SAME JURY 
ARE NECESSARY TO AVOID UNDUE PREJUDICE 
TO DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE. 
Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Utah Code Annotated [1953] , as amended, provides in its 
pertinent part as follows: 
Separate Trials. The court in 
furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
prejudice may order a separate trial 
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, 
or third-party claim, or of any separate 
issue or of any number of claims, cross-
claims, counterclaims, third-party 
claims, or issues, [emphasis added] 
The trial court has discretion to grant separate 
trials. Porcupine Reservoir Company v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 
15 Utah 2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 (Utah 1964). 
If plaintiffs' claims are tried all at the same time, 
the jury will be asked to reach a verdict on the amount of 
just compensation for the alleged breach of contract based on 
the jury's own sound discretion. However, the jury also would 
roO 
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be inundated and bombarded with opinions from plaintiffs1 
experts on the subject of what they would predict the same 
jury verdict should be. It would be impossible for a 
conscientious jury, which listens and weighs all the evi-
dence, not to be improperly influenced one way or the other 
in determining the damages by the evidence on the issues of 
alleged breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
acting in concert, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, liability for intentional consequences and liability 
for tortious conduct. 
The instant motion request's that the "First Cause Of 
Action" of Plaintiffs1 First Amended Complaint, which arises 
under contract law be tried separately from the issues raised 
in plaintiffs1 Causes Of Actions Two [2], Five [5], Six [6], 
Eight [8] and Nine [9], all of which are predicated in part 
or entirely as alleged consequence that resulted from the 
alleged breach of contract, however, if tried all at the same 
time, would be extremely prejudicial to defendant FIRE INSUR-
ANCE EXCHANGE. 
The issues of alleged breach of contract and all of plain-
tiffs' other causes of action may be separated for reasons 
they are not so interwoven that separation would contribute to 
uncertainty and confusion of the jury. Quite the contrary, such 
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a procedure will expedite the trial of this case and will 
be conducive to judicial expedition and economy. 
It is clear that bifurcating Plaintiffs1 First 
Cause Of Action for breach of contract would avoid preju-
dicial confusion in the conduct of the trial. 
POINT II 
SEPARATE TRIALS ARE NECESSARY FOR THE 
CONVENIENCE OF THE COURT AND PARTIES; 
THERE WOULD BE MINIMAL DUPLICATION OF 
EVIDENCE. 
In commenting on the similar federal rule, Professor 
Moore stated that an order granting separate trials is parti-
cularly advisable where the outcome of the first trial "would 
make it unnecessary to try other and more complicated issues." 
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 5, pp. 42-54. 
The court should grant separate trials for reason that 
should the jury in the first trial return a verdict there was 
no breach of contract, it appears there would be no basis for 
all other causes of action set forth in Plaintiffs1 First 
Amended Complaint, precluding the necessity of a lengthy, pro-
tracted jury trial, thereby saving judicial resources. Rule 1 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated [1953] , 
as amended, provides in pertinent part that "These rules . . . 
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shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action." 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
19 85) , the guiding and controlling decision on the issues in 
the instant case was also an action where the trial court, 
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, bifurcated the case and agreed to 
try the claim for failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits 
independent of the claim alleging breach of an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance contract. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, it is clear that bifurcating Plaintiffs1 
First Cause Of Action for breach of contract would avoid preju-
dicial confusion in the conduct of the trial and the court 
should grant Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion For 
Separate Trials in this matter for reasons and upon the grounds 
stated hereinabove. A denial of this defendant's motion would 
be inconsistent with equity and justice. Separate trials heard 
by the same jury are necessary to avoid undue prejudice to 
defendant FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE and are necessary for the con-
venience of the court and parties; there would be minimal dupli-
cation of evidence. 
-8-
DATED this 10th day of December, 3/986 
JYBA5T7 Attorney lui De-
.re/Insurance Exchange 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, ANGIE WHITE, hereby certify that on the 10th day 
of December, 1986, a copy of the foregoing Defendant Fire 
Insurance Exchange's Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In 
Support Of Motion For Separate' Trials was properly mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys at Law 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Francis M. Wikstrom 
Daniel W. Hindert 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys at Law 
185 South State Street 
Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carmen E. Kipp 
Karen J. McClurg 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Melvin G. Larew, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
1095 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
< . • / : -
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Stephen G. Morgan 
John E. Hansen 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
John M. Chipman 
Andrea C. Alcabes 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys at law 
13 00 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 





You are instructed that punitive damages constitute an 
extraordinary remedy outside the field of usual redress remedies1 
which should be applied with caution lest, engendered by passion 
or prejudice because of a wrongdoing, the award becomes 
unrealistic or unreasonable. Rnnh damages may br nwnrrtori whcrr 
_^tho nature—ef-the—w^eftg-~eomplained—of in—the injury inflicted 
^2oes_bjeYond—merely viulaLiny Lhe ilyliLa of ttnother in thai iL is" 
vfound to _ha-wilftil and malic 
The law provides no fixed standard as to the amount of 
punitive damages, but leaves the amount to the jury's sound 
discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice, however, the 
law requires that any award for such damages must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the actual damage?. 
Should you find by a preponderance of the evidence t£ar£ the 
plaintiffs "kr.e entitled to an award of J)unitive^damages, the 
factors to be con^i4ered in determining th^^ppropriateness of 
the amount are: [1] Tfte^relative wea^tn of the defendant; [2] 
The nature of defendant's mi^cpilauct? [3] The facts and 
circumstances surrounding defendant'^-IQISconduct; [4] The effect 
of defendant's misconduc^tron the lives of plaintiff and others; -
 t$ 
[5] The probability of future recurrence of the Misconduct; [6] 






The plaintiffs1 claim for fraud and misrepresentation 
against defendant Fire Insurance Exchange has six essential 
elements: 
First, that adjusters for defendant Fire Insurance Exchange 
made representations to the plaintiffs individually or their 
agents• 
Second, that one or more of these representations were 
false; 
Third, that the representations were known by the insurer's 
agents to be false or that the insurer's agents made the 
representations recklessly and without regard to their truth or 
falsity; 
Fourth, that the plaintiffs and their agents relied on the 
representations and were deceived by them; 
Fifth, that the plaintiffs acted reasonably in relying on 
the representations; and 
Sixth, that the false representations were the proximate 
cause of damages to the plaintiffs. 
If you find that the plaintiffs have established each of 
these elements by clear and convincing evidence, then you should 
return a verdict for the plaintiffs against the defendant insurer 
for misrepresentation and fraud. 
If you determine that the insurance company is liable to the 
plaintiffs for fraud, you shall award the plaintiffs compensatory 
APPENDIX E 
INSTRUCTION NO, ^o 
Page Two 
damages. Compensatory damages for fraud are restricted to the 
following: (1) the difference in amount between what the 
plaintiffs would have received had the misrepresentations not 
been made and what the plaintiffs actually received; and (2) any 
resulting losses which proximately resulted from the fraud. In 
assessing resulting losses, you may consider the plaintiffs1 loss 
of property, the plaintiffs1 expenses and debt associated with 
loss of the property, impairment of the plaintiffs1 credit, loss 
of the plaintiffs' financial reputation, and loss of plaintiffs1 
income. 
You may also award punitive damages in accordance with the 
instruction regarding punitive damages given hereafter. 
TabF 
F H £ D i H CLERK'S OFFICE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH 
FRANK A. ROYBAL [A2816] 
Attorney for Defendant 
Fire Insurance Exchange 
442 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone:[801]292-1483 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, and RANDI 
L. CROOKSTON, individuals, 
and ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 




JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H. 
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT, 
Second-Party 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE'S ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFFS1 SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C83-1030 
Judge David B. Dee 













COMES NOW the above-named defendant, FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, by and through its attorney, FRANK A. ROYBAL, and 
respectfully answers Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint in 
the above-entitled and numbered actions and admits, denies 
and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. That Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against 
defendant, FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. That this defendant admits thfe allegations con-
tained in paragraphs one [1], two [2] and three [3] of Plaintiffs' 
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Second Amended Complaint, without admitting said paragraphs 
state a cause of action. 
3. That this defendant, with respect to the alle-
gations contained in paragraph four [4] of Plaintiffs1 Second 
Amended Complaint, alleges it is without knowledge or infor-
mation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of all the 
allegations contained therein, therefore, the same are denied 
because some of the terms are vague and ambiguous. However, 
this defendant admits its agents and employees were at all 
times acting within the purpose and scope of their agency and 
employment, without admitting a cause of action is stated. 
4. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph five [5], having subparagraphs 
[a.] through [c] inclusive, as set forth in the First Cause Of 
Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, admits that 
prior to December 2, 1981, plaintiffs entered into a contract 
of insurance with this defendant, policy no. F6076 00 92, and 
only those allegations which comport to the specific language 
contained in said insurance policy, without admitting said 
statement states a cause of action, and alleges said contract 
of insurance speaks for itself; this defendant denies all other 
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allegations contained therein which are inapplicable and not 
part of said policy. 
5. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph six [6], as set forth in the 
First Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, 
admits only that throughout the period of said policy, plaintiffs 
paid the premiums and performed each act required on their part 
to keep the policy in full force and effect, without admitting 
said statement states a cause of action, and alleges it is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth of all other allegations contained therein, 
therefore, the same are denied. 
6. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph seven [7], as set forth in the First 
Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, admits 
only that on or about December 2, 1981, plaintiffs1 home sustained 
direct physical loss and that plaintiffs gave notice and that 
it became obligated to pay, without admitting said statement 
states a cause of action, and alleges the terms of the policy 
and laws of the State of Utah speak for themselves, therefore, 
all other allegations contained therein are denied because some 
L> ~r £u '- ^* ^ 
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of the terms are vague and ambiguous, and avers that the plain-
tiffs have obligations pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
the policy. 
7. That this defendant denies all the allegations 
contained in paragraphs eight [8] and nine [9], as set forth 
in the First Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended 
Complaint. 
8. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph ten [10], as set forth in the 
Second Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, 
realleges and incorporates by reference thereto its answers 
to paragraphs one [1] through nine [9] inclusive, as if fully 
set forth herein. 
9. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph eleven [11] , as set forth in the 
Second Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, 
admits only to act in good faith and deal fairly with plaintiffs 
when they entered into the contract of insurance and accepted 
premiums from plaintiffs, without admitting said statement states 
a cause of action, and denies all other allegations contained 
therein. 
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10. That this defendant denies all the allegations 
contained in paragraphs twelve [12] , thirteen [13] , having 
subparagraphs [a.] through [e.] inclusive, and fourteen [14], 
as set forth in the Second Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 
Second Amended Complaint. 
11. That this defendant, with respect to the alle-
gations contained in paragraph fifteen [15], as set forth in 
the Second Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Com-
plaint, alleges it is without knowledge or information sufficient 
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained 
therein, therefore, the same are denied. 
12. That this defendant denies all the allegations 
contained in paragraphs sixteen [16] and seventeen [17], as 
set forth in the Second Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second 
Amended Complaint. 
13. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraphs eighteen [18] through thirty-two 
[32] inclusive, of the Third and Fourth Causes Of Action, as 
set forth in Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, appear to 
assert no claim against this defendant, therefore, require no 
response, however, to the extent an answer may be required, all 
allegations contained therein are denied. 
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14. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph thirty-three [33] , as set forth 
in the Fifth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Com-
plaint, alleges and incorporates by reference thereto its answers 
to paragraphs one [1] through thirty-two [32] inclusive, as if 
fully set forth herein, 
15. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph thirty-four [34] , having sub-
paragraphs [a.] through [e.] inclusive, with subparagraph [d.] 
containing subparagraphs one [1] through four [4] inclusive, 
as set forth in the Fifth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second 
Amended Complaint alleges as follows: 
a. Admits only those allegations which comport to 
the specific language contained in policy no. F6076 00 92 
without admitting said statement states a cause of action and 
alleges said contract of insurance speaks for itself and denies 
all other allegations contained therein which are inapplicable 
and are not contained in said policy; 
b. Admits only that Denton Moser and Alan Clapperton 
represented they did not have authority to settle the claim and 
alleges it is without knowledge or information sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of all other allecrations contained 
therein, therefore, the same are denied; 
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c. Denies all the allegations contained therein; 
d. 1. Admits only the damage was $32,744.76, without 
admitting said statement states a cause of action and denies 
all other allegations contained therein; 
2. and 3. Admits the allegations contained therein 
without admitting said statements state a cause of action; 
4. Denies all the allegations contained therein; and 
e. Admits only that on or about June 18, 19 82, Alan 
Clapperton represented there had been a settlement under the 
policy with the bank and denies all other allegation contained 
therein. 
16. That this defendant denies all the allegations 
contained in paragraphs thirty-five [35] , thirty-six [36], 
and thirty-seven [3 7] , as set forth in the Fifth Cause Of 
Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. 
17. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraphs thirty-eight [38] and thirty-
nine [39], as set forth in the Fifth Cause Of Action of 
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, alleges it is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
the truth of all the allegations contained therein, therefore, 
the same are denied. 
18. That this defendant denies all the allegations 
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contained in paragraphs forty [40], forty-one [41] and prayer 
for judgment, as set forth in the Fifth Cause Of Action of 
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. 
19. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraphs forty-two [42] through forty-nine 
[49] inclusive, and prayer for judgment, as set forth in the 
Sixth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, 
appear to assert no claim against this defendant, therefore, 
require no response, however, to the extent an answer may be 
required, all allegations contained therein are denied. 
20. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph fifty [50] as set forth in the 
Seventh Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, 
alleges and incorporates by reference thereto its answers to 
paragraphs one [1] through forty-nine [49] inclusive, as if 
fully set forth herein. 
21. That this defendant denies all the allegations 
contained in paragraphs fifty-one [51] and fifty-two [52] as 
set forth in the Seventh Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second 
Amended Complaint. 
22. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph fifty-three [53] as set forth in 
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the Eighth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Com-
plaint, alleges and incorporates by reference thereto its 
answers to paragraphs one [1] through fifty-two [52] inclusive, 
as if fully set forth herein. 
23. That this defendant denies all the allegations 
contained in paragraphs fifty-four [54] and fifty-five [55] 
as set forth in the Eighth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 
Second Amended Complaint. 
24. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraphs fifty-six [56] through fifty-
eight [58] inclusive, as set forth in the Ninth Cause Of 
Action set forth in Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, 
appear to assert no claim against this defendant, therefore, 
require no response, however, to the extent an answer may 
be required, all allegations contained therein are denied. 
25. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph fifty-nine [59] as set forth 
in the Tenth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended 
Complaint, alleges and incorporates by reference thereto its 
answers to paragraphs one [1] through fifty-eight [58] inclu-
sive, as if fully set forth herein. 
26. That this defendant denies all the allegations 
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contained in paragraph sixty [60] as set forth in the Tenth 
Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. 
27. That this defendant, with respect to the allega-
tions contained in paragraph sixty-one [61] as set forth in 
the Eleventh Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, alleges and incorporates by reference thereto its 
answers to paragraphs one [1] through sixty [6 0] inclusive, 
as if fully set forth herein. 
28. That this defendant denies all the allegations 
contained in paragraph sixty-two [62] as set forth in the 
Eleventh Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Com-
plaint. 
29. That this defendant denies all the allegations 
contained in the prayer for judgment against this defendant 
containing subparagraphs [a.] through [d.] inclusive, of 
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. 
30. That this defendant, with respect to all the 
allegations of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, denies 
each and every allegation not herein admitted, controverted 
or specifically denied. 
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THIRD DEFENSE 
31. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
first affirmative defense, alleges it had a contractual right 
and obligation to pay and/or make compromise or settlement 
for loss or damage, if any, under the policy, directly with 
the payee named on the policy as the designated Mortgagee, 
defendant ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, for an amount no more or 
less than required to restore plaintiffs1 alleged property 
damage to its pre-loss condition. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
32. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
second affirmative defense, alleges the plaintiffs contrac-
tually assigned their rights to make any compromise or settle-
ment to defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, in a certain 
TRUST DEED dated the 11th day of December, 1980, which states 
as follows: 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 8. Should 
said property or any part thereof be 
taken or damaged by reason of any public 
improvement or condemnation proceeding, 
or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in 
any other manner, Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to all compensation, awards, and 
other payments or relief therefor, and 
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shall be entitled at its option to com-
mence, appear in and prosecute in its own 
name, any action or proceedings, or to 
make any compromise or settlement, in 
connection with such taking or damage. 
All such compensation, awards, damages, 
rights of action and proceeds, including 
the proceeds of any policies of fire and 
other insurance affecting said property, 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who 
may, after deducting therefrom all its 
expenses, including attorney's fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured 
hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such 
further assignments of any compensation, 
award, damages, and rights of action and 
proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may 
require. 
therefore, plaintiffs are barred from recovering from this 
defendant. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
33. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
third affirmative defense, alleges that pursuant to the 
Lender's Loss Payable Endorsement, it had a contractual 
right and obligation to pay and/or make any compromise or 
settlement for loss or damage, if any, under the policy, 
directly with the payee named on the policy as the desig-
nated Mortgagee, defendant ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK; the 
MORTGAGEE CLAUSE states as follows: 
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Loss (if any) under this policy, on 
buildings only, shall be payable to 
the mortgagee(s), if named as payee(s) 
on the first page of this policy, as 
mortgagee(s) under any present or 
future mortgage upon the property des-
cribed in and covered by this policy, 
as interest may appear, and in order 
of precedence of said mortgages. (A) 
The terms "mortgage", "mortgagee" and 
"mortgagor" wherever used in this rider 
shall be deemed to include deeds of trust 
and the respective parties thereto. 
(B) This insurance, as to the interest 
of the mortgagee only therein, shall 
not be invalidated by any act or neg-
lect of the mortgagor or owner of the 
described property, nor by the use of 
the premises for purposes more hazardous 
than are permitted by this policy. (C) 
any mortgagee who shall have or acquire 
knowledge that the premises are being 
used for purposes more hazardous than 
are permitted by this policy or that the 
premises have been vacant or unoccupied 
beyond the period permitted by this 
policy, shall forthwith notify this com-
pany thereof and shall cause the consent 
of the company thereto to be noted on 
this policy; and in the event of failure 
so to do, all rights of such mortgagee 
hereunder shall forthwith terminate. 
(D) in case the mortgagor or owner 
shall fail to pay any premium due or to 
become due under this policy, the mort-
gagee hereby covenants and agrees to 
pay the same on demand. The mortgagee 
also covenants and agrees to pay on demand 
the premium for any increased hazard for 
the term of the existence thereof. (E) 
this company shall not be liable to the 
mortgagee for a greater proportion of any 
loss than the amount hereby insured shall 
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bear to the whole insurance covering the 
property against the peril involved, 
under policies issued to, held by, or 
payable to the mortgagee, whether collec-
tible or not. (F) The policy provisions 
relating to "mortgagee interests and 
obligations" are specifically referred 
to and made a part of this rider. 
therefore, plaintiffs are barred from recovering from this 
defendant. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
34. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
fourth affirmative defense, alleges it acted reasonably and 
in good faith in settlement with defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
STATE BANK, by reason of said bank's acceptance of settle-
ment. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
35. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
fifth affirmative defense, alleges it could not have reason-
ably foreseen plaintiffs' alleged damages that may have 
occurred after settlement with defendant ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
STATE BANK, moreover, this defendant did nqt, nor could it 
have exercised any control over said bank's conduct or its 
| „ / »- « * » - <*. 
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disposition of the THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-
FOUR DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-SIX CENTS [$32,744.76] paid, there-
fore, this defendant cannot be responsible or held liable 
for any of plaintiffs' alleged damages that may have occurred 
after settlement. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
36. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
sixth affirmative defense, alleges that if in fact there was 
bad faith conduct and/or fault on the part of this defendant, 
which is specifically denied, nonetheless, the plaintiffs 
were also guilty of bad faith conduct and/or fault in the 
prosecuting, handling and management of the claims referred 
to in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and as a proximate 
cause of their bad faith acts and/or fault, omissions and 
failure, among other things, to provide accurate, full and 
complete information in a timely manner to this defendant, 
which was of such a nature and degree that any recovery by 
plaintiffs should be apportionately and comparatively re-
duced by the amount of bad faith conduct and/or fault of 
plaintiffs. 
/ »> i \ * 
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NINTH DEFENSE 
37. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
seventh affirmative defense, alleges under the terms of the 
insurance policy, plaintiffs failed to comply with certain 
conditions precedent which provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
Requirements in case loss occurs. The 
insured shall give immediate written 
notice to this Company of any loss, pro-
tect the property from further damage, 
forthwith separate the damaged and un-
damaged personal property, put it in 
the best possible order, furnish a 
complete inventory of the destroyed, 
damaged and undamaged property, show-
ing in detail quantities, costs, actual 
cash value and amount of loss claimed; 
and within sixty days after the loss, 
unless such time is extended in writing 
by this Company, the insured shall 
render to this Company a proof of 
loss, signed and sworn to by the in-
sured, stating the knowledge and 
belief of the insured as to the 
following: the time and origin of 
the loss, the interest of the insured 
and of all others in the property, 
the actual cash value of each item 
thereof and the amount of loss thereto, 
all encumbrances thereon, all other 
contracts of insurance, whether valid 
or not, covering any of said property, 
any changes in the title, use, occu-
pation, location, possession or ex-
posure of said property since the 
issuing of this policy, by whom and 
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for what purpose any building herein 
described and the several parts there-
of were occupied at the time of loss 
and whether or not it then stood on 
leased ground, and shall furnish a 
copy of all the descriptions and 
schedules in all policies and, if 
required, verified plans and speci-
fications of any building, fixtures 
or machinery destroyed or damaged. 
The insured, as often as may be reason-
ably required, shall exhibit to any 
person designated by this Company all 
that remains of any property herein 
described, and submit to examinations 
under oath by any person named by this 
Company, and subscribe the same; and, 
as often as may be reasonably required, 
shall produce for examination all books 
of account, bills, invoices and other 
vouchers, or certified copies thereof 
if originals be lost, at such reason-
able time and place as may be designated 
by this Company or its representative, 
and shall permit extracts and copies 
thereof to be made. 
therefore, plaintiffs are barred from recovering from this 
defendant. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
38. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
eighth affirmative defense, alleges under the terms of the 
insurance policy, plaintiffs failed to comply with certain 
conditions precedent which provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
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Appraisal. In case the insured and this 
Company shall fail to agree as to the 
actual cash value or the amount of loss, 
then, on the written demand of either, 
each shall select a competent and dis-
interested appraiser and notify the 
other of the appraiser selected within 
twenty days of such demand. The apprai-
sers shall first select a competent and 
disinterested umpire; and failing for 
fifteen days to agree upon such umpire, 
then, on request of the insured or this 
Company, such umpire shall be selected 
by a judge of a court of record in the 
state in which the property is located. 
The appraisers shall then appraise the 
loss, stating separately actual cash 
value and loss to each item; and, fail-
ing to agree, shall submit their differ-
ences, only, to the umpire. An award 
in writing, so itemized, of any two 
when filed with this Company shall de-
termine the amount of actual cash value 
and loss. Each appraiser shall be 
paid by the party selecting him and 
the expenses of appraisal and umpire 
shall be paid by the parties equally. 
therefore, plaintiffs are barred frpm recovering from this 
defendant. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
39. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
ninth affirmative defense, alleges plaintiffs did not comply 
with a contract provision of limitation in the insurance 
policy which provides in pertinent part that: 
C 
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Suit. No suit or action on this 
policy for the recovery of any claim 
shall be sustainable in any court of 
law or equity unless all the require-
ments of this policy shall have been 
complied with, and unless commenced 
within twelve months next after in-
ception of the loss. 
which is in compliance with §31-19-19 (c), Utah Code Annotated 
[19 53] , as amended. Plaintiffs commenced this action on or 
about the 8th day of February, 1983, alleging the loss occurred 
on or about the 2nd day of December, 1981. Therefore, plain-
tiffs are barred from recovering from this defendant for failing 
to commence their action within twelve [12] months from and 
after the date of loss. 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
40. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
tenth affirmative defense, alleges the plaintiffs acted im-
prudently, without reason and just cause in filing bankruptcy. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
41. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
eleventh affirmative defense, alleges plaintiffs failed to 
mitigate all of their alleged damages. 
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FOURTEENTH DEFENSE 
42. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
twelfth affirmative defense, alleges plaintiffs1 claims in 
part, state and suggest there are tort duties imposed on a 
contractual relationship, which is specifically denied, none-
theless, in the first-party relationship between this defen-
dant and the plaintiffs, the duties and obligations of said 
parties are contractual rather than fiduciary only, therefore, 
a contract cannot give rise to a tort action and plaintiffs' 
assertions are not only inappropriate, but are in violation 
of the laws of Utah, Constitution Of Utah and the Constitution 
Of The United States Of America. 
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE 
43. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
thirteenth affirmative defense, alleges no punitive or exem-
plary damages may be awarded against this defendant on the 
action for breach of contract or any other cause of action; 
plaintiffs' action is not an independent tort and none exist. 
The duties and obligations of the plaintiffs and this defen-
dant are contractual rather than fiduciary. 
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SIXTEENTH DEFENSE 
44. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
fourteenth affirmative defense, alleges there is no express or 
implied agreement or statute that allows plaintiffs to re-
cover attorney's fees from this defendant for breach of con-
tract or any other cause of action; plaintiffs1 recovery, if 
any, is contractually limited to actual policy benefits and 
limits. 
SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE 
45. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
fifteenth affirmative defense, alleges plaintiffs lack stand-
ing to assert any of the causes of action set forth in Plain-
tiffs1 Second Amended Complaint because each such cause of 
action is alleged therein to have arisen prior to the time 
the plaintiffs filed in bankruptcy, therefore, the proper party 
to assert any such causes of action is the bankruptcy trustee. 
EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE 
46. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
sixteenth affirmative defense, alleges it acted in good faith 
' : ' > : - 3 
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at all material times herein, and fulfilled all its require-
ments, pursuant to the provisions of §31-1-8, Utah Code 
Annotated [1953] , as amended. 
NINETEENTH DEFENSE 
47. That this defendant, as a separate and distinct 
seventeenth affirmative defense, alleges some or all of the 
plaintiffs1 claims are without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith, and by reason of the premises, this 
defendant is entitled to, and will seek, reasonable attorney's 
fees, pursuant to the provisions of §76-27-56, Utah Code 
Annotated [1953] , as amended. 
TWENTIETH DEFENSES 
48. That this defendant, a$ separate and distinct 
affirmative defenses, alleges that if the facts prove, plain-
tiffs are not entitled to recover against this defendant by 
reasons of accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
comparative negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, 
statute of limitations and waiver. 
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WHEREFORE, this defendant respectfully prays that 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint be dismissed, with pre-
judice, taking nothing thereby, and that this defendant be 
awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court incurred 
herein, and such other and further relief as the court deems 
proper and just in the premises. 






Defendant 's address: 
4142 Riverdale Road 
P.O. Box 9756 
Ogden, Utah 84409 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J'LYNNE H. WOLFLEY, hereby certify that on the 
28th day of January, 1987, a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT was properly mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
•*<\* ; ^ \ 3 
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L. Rich Humpherys 
M. Douglas Bayly 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys at Law 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Francis M. Wikstrom 
Daniel W. Hindert 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys at Law 
185 South State Street 
Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen G. Morgan 
John E. Hansen 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John M. Chipman 
Linda L. W. Roth 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys at Law 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Carmen E. Kipp 
Karen J. McClurg 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Melvin G. Larew, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
1095 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Anna W. Drake 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys at Law 
Beneficial Life Tower, #1100 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Raymond M. Berry 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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FRANK A. ROYBAL [A2816] 
Attorney for Defendant 
Fire Insurance Exchange 
442 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone:[801J292-1483 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES; AND MOTION 
IN LIMINE 
Civil No. C83-1030 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
COMES NOW defendant, FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, by and 
through its attorney, FRANK A. ROYBAL and hereby respectfully 
submits the following response to plaintiffs' TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES and moves the court for an order in limine 
instructing plaintiffs to refrain absolutely from making any 
direct or indirect reference in person, by counsel, by witness, 
or by conduct, of defendant's 1986 Annual Statement. 
APPENDIX G 
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, there was a 
clear distinction between the remedies for breach of a 
contractual duty and the remedies for breach of a duty founded in 
tort law. The reason for the differences in contract and tort 
remedies lies in the origin of the interests each seeks to 
protect. The law of contracts is concerned with a single, 
limited interest—giving the parties the benefit of their 
bargain. The primary aim in measuring damages is to put the 
wronged party in the position he would have been in had the 
contract been performed. In contrast to contract law, which 
focuses on the consensual agreement between the parties, tort law 
is based primarily on social policy. It protects a person's 
interest in being free from certain types of harm. The duties 
imposed by tort law extend to the entire class of persons the law 
seeks to protect rather than just the parties to the contract and 
any express third party beneficiaries. 
The application of a tort to conduct under the contract 
occurring before judicial recognition of that tort arguably is a 
retroactive alteration of one party's obligations under the 
contract in violation of the Contract Clause, United States 
Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1. The imposition of 
punitive damages on one party to the contract may also run afoul 
of the Due Process Clause, United States Constitution, Fifth 
r^ n ^ "It 
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Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, and the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, United States Constitution, 
Eighth Amendment. 
This court should give consideration to the 
constitutionality and propriety of allowing the jury to award 
punitive damages in the case at bar. Duffy, Punitive Damages: A 
Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, printed in Defense Research 
Institute, "The Case Against Punitive Damages" 4 [1969]; Ford, 
The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, "The Case Against 
Punitive Damages" 15 [1969]. 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT BE AWARDED PUNITIVE OR 
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
The plaintiffs are not entitled to exemplary or 
punitive damages for breach of contract. The Utah Supreme Court 
heretofore has not approved an award of punitive damages for 
breach of contract, therefore, no punitive damages are permitted 
in the case at bar. First Security Bank of Utah v. Turkey 
Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329 [Utah 1980]; Jorgensen v. John Clay & 
Co., 660 P.2d 229 [Utah 1983]; Farris v. U. S. Fidelity and 
Guaranty Co., 587 P.2d 1015 [Or. 1978]; Purington v. South West, 
566 P.2d 795 [Mont. 1977]; Continental Nat. Bank v. Evans, 489 
P.2d 15 [Ariz. 1971]; 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, Section 245 [1965]; 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 342 [1982]; Williston on 
e'3 
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Contracts, Section 1340 [Rev.Ed., 1968]; Sutherland on Damages, 
Exemplary Damages, Section 391 [4th Ed., 1916]; Lavoie v. Aetna 
Life & Casualty Co., 405 So.2d 310, 312 [Ala. 1979]; 405 So.2d 
17, 18 [Ala. 1981]; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, No. 84-
1601 [U.S.Sup.Ct. 1985]; United States Constitution, Article I, 
Section 10, Clause 1; United States Constitution, Fifth 
Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1; United States 
Constitution, Eighth Amendment; Constitution of Utah, Article I, 
Section 7. 
Damages recoverable for breach of contract include both 
general damages, i.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, 
and consequential damages, i.e., those reasonably within the 
contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at 
the time the contract was made. Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 [Utah 1985]; Pacific Coast Title Insurance 
Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 325 P.2d 906, 907 [Utah 
1958]; Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 145 Eng.Rep. 145 [1854]. 
II. 
PLAINTIFFS' AND DEFENDANT'S RELATIONSHIP ARE 
CONTRACTUAL AND A BREACH OF IMPLIED OR 
EXPRESS DUTIES CAN ONLY GIVE RISE TO A CAUSE 
OF ACTION IN CONTRACT, NOT ONE IN TORT. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 [Utah 1985] held that "the duties and 
obligations of the parties [plaintiffs and defendant] are 
5 
contractual rather than fiduciary. Without more, a breach of 
those implied or express duties can only give rise to a cause of 
action in contract, not one in tort." Duncan v. Andrew County 
Mutual Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d at 18-19; Lawton v. Great 
Southwest Fire insurance Co., 392 A.2d 576 [N.H. 1978]; Kewin v. 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 295 N.W.2d 50 [Mich. 
1980]. 
III. 
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS NOT WILFUL AND 
MALICIOUS, THEREFORE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY 
NOT BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFFS. 
There is no evidence in the record that defendant's 
conduct was wilful and malicious. On the contrary, plaintiffs1 
claim of defendant's failure to pay enough hardly constitutes 
defendant was intentionally motivated by malice or that it had a 
bad motive intended to injure the plaintiffs. Kesler v. Rogers, 
542 P.2d 353 [Utah 1975]; Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 [Utah 
1980]; Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605 
P.2d 312 [Utah 1979]; McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 
P.2d 298 [Utah 1984]. 
Punitive damages constitute and extraordinary remedy 
outside the field of usual redress remedies1 which should be 
applied with caution lest, engendered by passion or prejudice 
because of a wrongdoing, the award becomes unrealistic or 
unreasonable. Such damaged may be awarded where the nature of 
if 
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the wrong complained of in the injury inflicted goes beyond 
merely violating the rights of another in that it is found to be 
wilful and malicious. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFFS1 HAVE NO CLAIM FOR SEVERE 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UNLESS THEY CAN PROVE 
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS INTENTIONAL AND 
OUTRAGEOUS. 
Outrageous conduct may only be found if the 
circumstances of this case are intolerable, unusually extreme and 
aggravated. The plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that defendant intended to cause severe emotional 
distress to plaintiffs and there was a causal connection that 
existed between defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs1 emotional 
distress. The payment of an insurance claim, which is claimed to 
be insufficient in amount, is conduct that cannot be considered 
extreme and sufficiently outrageous to cause plaintiffs severe 
emotional distress, Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 [Utah 1961]. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to even have the jury 
consider awarding punitive damages in the case at bar. 
Should the court allow this cause of action to go to 
the jury, there is no definite standard by which to compensate 
the plaintiffs for the alleged severe emotional distress and the 
jury should exercise calm and reasonable judgment in considering 
any damages whatsoever. An alleged insufficient payment cannot 
c1 
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be construed by any reasonable person as an act constituting a 
breach of contract that would result in breaches of duty that are 
independent of the contract and that give rise to causes of 
action in tort. 
V. 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CLAIM FOR FRAUD AND 
MISREPRESENTATION UNLESS THEY CAN PROVE BY 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE EACH AND EVERY 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT. 
Fraud and misrepresentation require proof by clear and 
convincing evidence of each and every essential element which are 
[1] That a representation was made; [2] concerning a presently 
existing material fact; [3] which was false; [4] which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; [5] for the purpose of inducing the other 
party to act upon it; [6] that the other party, acting reasonably 
and in ignorance of its falsity; [7] did in fact rely upon it; 
[8] and was thereby induced to act; [9] to his injury and damage. 
If the plaintiffs fail to prove all the essential elements, 
which means if only one element cannot be proven by the 
plaintiffs, then plaintiffs have no cause of action against FIRE 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE for fraud and misrepresentation, Pace vs. 
Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 [Utah 1952]; Sugarhouse Fin. Co. vs. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 [Utah 1980]; Elder vs. Clawson, 384 P.2d 
^ 
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802 [Utah 1963]; Jones vs. Pingree, 273 P. 303, 305 [Utah 1928]. 
Generally, promises or expressions of future intention 
are not actionable for fraud. This rule applies as long as the 
intention to perform was made in good faith at the time, even 
though the promisor changes his mind and fails or refuses to 
perform in the future. A promise accompanied by the present 
intention not to perform and made in order to mislead, is 
actionable deceit. Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 
798, 804 [Utah 1980]; Second Restatement of Torts, Section 530 
and comments [1977]; W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 
§109 at 730 [4th ed. 1971]; Cerritos Trucking Co v. Utah Venture 
No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 612 [Utah 1982]; Hull v. Flinders, 27 P.2d 
56, 58 [Utah 1933]. 
The plaintiffs have the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence all of the facts necessary to establish 
fraud. Evidence based on mere suspicion or innuendo is not 
sufficient to establish fraud, Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 
293, 294-95 ["fraud is a wrong of such nature that is must be 
shown by clear and convincing proof and will not lie in mere 
suspicion or innuendo"]; quoting Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of 
America, 405 P.2d 339, 341 [Utah 1965]. "Clear and convincing 
evidence" means a higher degree of proof than preponderance of 
the evidence. It is the degree of proof which will produce in 
the mind of the jury a firm belief or conviction. 
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VI. 
PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MUST BEAR A 
REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO ACTUAL DAMAGES AND 
THE RELATIVE NET WEALTH OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that punitive or 
exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relationship to actual 
damages, Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 760 [Utah 
1984]; Cruz v, Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 727 [Utah 1983]. 
The relative net wealth of defendant FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE is stated in the Annual Statement Of The Fire Insurance 
Exchange of Los Angeles in the State of California To The 
Insurance Department Of The State Of . . For The Year Ended 
December 31, 1981. Corporate assets are not determinative of its 
net worth and as such, the appropriate figure which the court may 
allow the jury to consider is the "Surplus as regards policy-
holders, December 31 current year" contained in the annual 
statement for the year 1981 which is the year of the plaintiffs 
alleged loss. 
FOURTH MOTION IN LIMINE 
Should the court find it appropriate to allow 
plaintiffs1 counsel to introduce at trial defendant FIRE 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE'S Annual Statement for the jury's 
consideration of punitive damages, then the year used should be 
1981 which is the year of the plaintiffs alleged loss; 
plaintiffs1 counsel will attempt to introduce defendant FIRE 
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INSURANCE EXCHANGE'S 1986 Annual Statement which would be 
inappropriate and inequitable upon the ground such statement 
would not accurately reflect the relationship between the 
parties, the relative wealth of the defendant, the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct and the amount 
of the actual damages awarded on December 2, 1981, 
WHEREFORE, defendant FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE moves the 
court to preclude plaintiffs from introducing, by any method 
whatsoever, the 1986 Annual Statement for reasons stated 
hereinabove. Defendant FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE further moves 
that a mistrial be granted if such evidence is attempted. 
DATED this 1st day of June, 1987. 
V-. A. BDYBAty Attorney for 
Defendant Lfire Jlnsurance Exchange 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I, FRANK A. ROYBAL, hereby certify that on the 1st day 
of June, 1987, a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL MEMORANDUM PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES; AND MOTION IN LIMINE was hand delivered to L. Rich 
11 
Humpherys of the firm CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, Attorneys for 
plaintiffs. 
•
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3>^ > 
In addition to the compensatory damages, tne Crookstons 
also seek an award of punitive damages against Fire Insurance 
Exchange. 
Before punitive damages may be awarded against Fire 
Insurance Exchange, you must find the issues in favor of the 
plaintiffs and against the insurance company and further, you 
must find from a preponderance of the evidence that the insurance 
company's employees' conduct was willful and malicious, or such 
conduct was done with a knowing and reckless indifference toward, 
and disregard of, the Crookstons1 rights. If you so find, you 
may award, if you deem it proper to do so, such sum as in your 
judgment would be reasonable and proper as a punishment to Fire 
Insurance Exchange for such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning to 
others not to offend in like manner. If such punitive damages 
are given, you should award them with caution and you should keep 
in mind they are only for the purpose just mentioned and not the 
measure of compensatory damages. 
In determining the amount of punitive damages, you 
should consider each of the following factors: 
1. the relative wealth of the defendant; 
2. the nature of the defendant's misconduct; 
3. the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
defendant's misconduct; 
APPENDIX H 
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4. the effect of defendant's misconduct on the lives 
of the plaintiffs and others; 
5. the probability of future recurrence of the mis-
conduct; 
6. the relationship between the parties; and 
7. the amount of compensatory damages awarded. 
Punitive damages should be more than an inconvenience to the 
defendant and their amount should be sufficient to discourage the 
defendant and other companies similarly situated from doing or 




You are instructed that punitive damages constitute an 
extraordinary remedy outside the field of usual redress remedies 
which should be applied with caution lest, engendered by passion 
or prejudice because of a wrongdoing, the award becomes 
unrealistic or unreasonable. 
The law provides no fixed standard as to the amount of 
punitive damages, but leaves the amount to the jury's sound 
discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice, however, the 
law requires that any award for such damages must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the actual damages. 
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L. Rich Humpherys, #1582 
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
510 Clark Learning Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the Estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REGARDING REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Ciyil No. C83-1030 
Juc^ ge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiff's Motion to Determine Award of Attorneys' Fees came 
on regularly before the court on the 14th day of December, 1987 
at the time of 1:30 p.m. Plaintiffs were represented by their 
attorney, L. Rich Humpherys, and defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange was represented by its attorneys, Philip R. Fishier, 
Stephen J. Trayner, and Frank A. Roybal. The court, having 
considered the plaintiff's motion, Affidavit of L. Rich 
Humpherys, Deposition of L. Rich Humpherys, memoranda filed by 
the parties, together with all other information contained in the 
court's file, and having further been present during the trial of 
APPENDIX J 
the above matter, ruled in plaintiff's favor by a Minute Entry 
Ruling dated December 22, 1987. The court now enters its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lavf. 
FINDINGS OF FAfo 
1. H. Ralph Klemm, a licensed attorney, represented the 
plaintiffs as it relates to the present action from September, 
1982, until approximately June, 1984. 
2. Because of a conflict of interest, it was necessary 
that Mr. Klemm withdraw as counsel for the plaintiffs and L. Rich 
Humpherys was retained to represent the plaintiffs from June, 
1984 to the present. 
3. Both attorney Klemm and HUmpherys are experienced 
litigation attorneys. Mr. Humpherys and his law firm have 
special expertise, experience and knowledge relating to the 
procedures and practices of insurance companies and the area of 
bad faith insurance law. 
4. Because of the numerous witnesses, exhibits, number of 
parties in the third party action, the factual and legal 
complexities of the case, and the lack of significant legal 
precedent, the litigation was difficult and novel, and the time 
and expenses incurred by plaintiffs' attorneys were not excessive 
and were reasonably incurred. 
5. At trial, plaintiffs attorneys were well prepared and 
presented plaintiffs' case effectively and efficiently, using 
among other things, visual aids, transparencies of exhibits on an 
overhead projector, and photographs. 
6. The plaintiffs in this case were financially bankrupt 
and unable to finance the litigation and pay the attorneys1 fees 
without recovery. These kinds of cases are customarily handled 
on a contingency fee basis of at least one-third of any recovery. 
The amount of $175,000 represents less than 4% of the total 
judgment against the defendant Fire Insurance Exchange. 
7. The amount of plaintiffs' damages claimed in this case 
were substantial and the judgment obtained is one of the largest 
verdicts in Utah history. 
8. In order to pursue litigation of this kind, there are 
substantial expenses and costs (in addition to the court costs 
customarily allowed under Rule 54(d) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure) that are necessarily incurred and charged to the 
clients as part of the attorneys1 bill, such as expert witness 
fees, depositions, photocopies, photographs, trial aids, and 
other miscellaneous expenses. In addition to the court costs in 
the amount of $2,870.32 as described in plaintiffs Memorandum of 
Costs and Disbursements and in the amount of $1,320 as described 
in plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements, plaintiffs have necessarily and reasonably 
incurred an additional $11,126 in costs and litigation expenses. 
This amount reflects a set off for the court costs otherwise 
awarded pursuant to Rule 54(d). 
9. The amount of $175,000 for attorneys' fees and $11,12 6 
in necessary litigation expenses are reasonable under the 
circumstances of this case. 
00336* 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
1. The amount of $175,000 constitutes reasonable and 
necessary attorneys* fees and the amount of $11,126 constitutes 
reasonable and necessary litigation expenses incurred by the 
plaintiffs in prosecuting their action herein. 
2. Defendant is liable to plaintiffs for said attorneys' 
fees and litigation expenses. 
DATED this 
BY THE//COURT: 
i  e n s e s . . / 
_//#clay of^Haramber, 1 9 8 / . 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING 
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS1 FEES was hand delivered to Philip R. 
Fishier, Strong & Hanni, 6th Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah and a copy mailed to Frank Roybal, 442 North Main 
Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010 this _day of December, 1987. 
>' 




H. RALPH KLEMM 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
SU^TE 5 0 0 • CLARK LEAMING OFF ICE CENTER 
175 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
PHONE <801> 328 -2206 
September 27, 1982 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
The following is a summary of my representation of 
Mr. and Mrs. S. Larry Crooks ton in connection with their claim 
against Farmer's Insurance Company and Rocky Mountain State Bank 
of Bountiful. 
Mr. and Mrs. Crookston were owners of a lot located at 
3745 South Orchard Drive in Bountiful, Utah. After some contact 
with Mr. Jimmie L. Jones, an architect in Salt Lake City, they 
decided to build an "Earth Home" on the property in accordance 
with a design prepared by Mr. Jones. Mr. Kyle Brewster was re-
tained as a contractor to construct the home. 
Arrangements were made with the Rocky Mountain State Bank 
of Bountiful to borrow the money to construct the home on the lot. 
The bank made an initial loan of $30,000.00 and a subsequent loan 
in the same amount, making a total of $60,000.00 that the bank 
loaned to the Crookstons to construct the house on the property. 
The house was not yet finished when the $60,000.00 had all been 
distributed to the contractors on a draw basis. The Crookstons 
went to the bank to obtain additional funds so that they could 
finish the home. Before the bank would loan any more funds to 
them, they required the Crookstons to raise $12,000.00 from other 
sources and post it with the bank. This money was borrowed from 
Mrs. Crookston1s parents, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Hill of Bountiful, 
Utah. 
With the $60,000.00 that was loaned by the bank, Mr. 
Brewster had completed approximately 907o of the work necessary to 
construct the home. The major work that remained to be completed 
was to place dirt around the home as a energy cover and then com-
plete some other parts of the outside of the house. When the bank 
received the money from the Crookstons, Mr. Brewster was given 
the authority to go ahead and finish the house. 
While Mr. Brewster was placing dirt on top of the house, 
probably contrary to the plans prepared by Mr. Jones, the entire 
structure collapsed and the inside of the house was completely 
ruined The only thing that can be salvaged is the foundation 
to the house. All of the existing construction on the inside of 
the house was destroyed. 
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Farmers Insurance Company had issued a casualty policy on 
the construction of the home, and they agreed that the damage to 
the home was covered by the policy. The claim was being handled 
by the Ogden office of Farmers Insurance Company. Three bids 
were obtained by the Crookstons and myself. Mr. Pvex Stallings sub-
mitted a bid to reconstruct the premises to the previous completion 
point for the sum of $49,600.00. Kyle Brewster, the original con-
tractor, submitted a bid of $51,000.00 to restore the structure to 
its condition at the time of the collapse. The construction company 
operated by the architect submitted a bid of $74,000.00 for recon-
struction work. All of these bids were submitted to the insurance 
company. 
The insurance company was unusually effective in stalling 
the payment of the claim to the Crookstons. A period of 6 months 
passed from the time the house collapsed until final settlement was 
made. Rocky Mountain State Bank of Bountiful became very impatient 
about repayment of the loan. Its representatives wanted the money 
that they had advanced on the .contruction of the home. The Crookstons 
had no funds to pay the amount due and were looking to the insurance 
company to cover the loss on the property. The bank was putting on 
pressure to obtain payments on the loan and to obtain the insurance 
funds that were being paid by the insurance company. 
Soon after I entered the case, there was a dispute between 
myself and the bank about what was going to be done with the insurance 
funds. I told them that they would not be permitted to take all of 
the money payable under the insurance claim to apply against their 
debt and thereby leave these young people without any way of repair-
ing or reconstructing the home. Bank personnel represented to me 
on several occasions that they had no intention of leaving these 
young people without some means of reconstructing their home. No 
details were discussed in this regard. 
After all the bids had been submitted to the insurance 
company, numerous calls were made to try to get payment of the claim. 
The* company stated that it had to have its engineer look over the 
bids and see if they were accurate. Company representatives obvious-
ly wanted further time to obtain a bid of their own from a contractor 
who would have the opportunity to review the other bids before making 
the bid for the insurance company. Apparently they obtained a bid 
from Phipps Construction Company for the unbelievable low price 
of $27,000.00 to repair the damage done by the collapse of the 
home. However, they never notified the Crookstons or myself 
that such a bid existed. Instead, the insurance c om p an y 
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x>;ent directly to the Rocky Mountain State Bank of Bountiful and 
negotiated a settlement of the Crookston claim for $27,000.00. 
The bank applied $5,000.00 of that amount to accrued interest and 
$22,000.00 to the construction loan, leaving the Crookstons with 
an additional debt of approximately $28,000.00 payable to the bank 
on the construction loan. 
It should be remembered that the insurance company had 
three bids in its possession, two of which were around $50,000.00. 
The settlement that was made with the bank was made without the 
knowledge of the Crookstons or their attorney. On the very day 
that the settlement was made, the Crookstons attorney called the 
insurance company and was told that the company wasn't quite ready 
to negotiate a settlement of the Crookston claim. Neither the 
Crookstons nor the attorney were invited to participate in the 
settlement in any way. Both the bank and the insurance company were 
well aware that the Crookstons were represented by an attorney who 
was working on the claim in their behalf. 
Late in the afternoon of the day of the settlement, the 
insurance company and the bank announced to the attorney that they 
had settled the claim and that the Crookstons had nothing to say 
about it. 
The only way the Crookstons could get out of the terrible 
mess that the insurance company and the bank left them in was to 
take out bankruptcy, which they did about two months ago. The 
bank obligation has, of course, been liquidated by the bankruptcy. 
The bank was the real loser in the settlement that was made. 
After they filed bankruptcy, the Crookstons agreed to convey 
ownership of the lot to the bank to partially satisfy the amount 
owing under the Trust Deed. For sotne unknown reason, the bank has 
refused the tender of the deed to this date. It appears that they 
want to go ahead and foreclose on the lot and obtain title the 
hard way. 
The settlement of the Crookston claim by the bank and the 
insurance company under the circumstances stated above was the 
most aggravated case of insurance misconduct that this writer has 
seen in 26 years of law practice. While it is true that the Trust 
Deed signed' by the Crookstons provides for any casualty loss to 
be paid to the bank for application against the loan obligation, 
the settlement of the case without knowledge to the Crookstons 
for little more than one-half of the actual loss is unconscionable. 
The bank has received its just rewards by having to write off as 
a loss most of the remaining loan. But the insurance company is 
the real culprit in this whole affair. The company obtained a bid 
from a contractor who knew that he would never be hired to rebuild 
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the hone at the price that he stated in his bid. It is doubtful 
that the contractor even visited the scene of the Crookston 
construction. The bid was obviously obtained by the insurance 
company with the idea of depriving the Crookstons of the benefits 
available under the policy. 
I suppose the Crookstons have a good lawsuit against the 
bank and the insurance company for fraud, misrepresentation and 
conspiracy under the circumstances set forth above. Only their 
lack of funds at the present time prevents them from bringing that 
suit. We hope the insurance commissioner can assist them in some 
way in resolving this matter without the need for such a lawsuit. 
HRK:kc 
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T H E 
^ Farmers Insurance Group O F C O M P A N I E S 
2500 S FIFTH AVENUE • POCATELLO IDAHO 83201 
MAILING ADDRESS P O BOX 4820 
November 2, 1982 
State of Utah 
Departnent of Insurance 
326 South Fifth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attn: David G. Pearson 
Exaniner 
Re: Your Pile No: 012323 
Insured: Larry Crookston 
Date of Loss: 12/2/31 
Dear Mr. Pearson: 
Thank you for your letter of October 15, 1982. 
Vfe would like to respond to Attorney E. Ralph Klenm's 
allegations of September 26, 1932. Below is a list of his " 
allegations and our responses to them in chronological order. 
*1 Allegation - The entire structure collapsed and the inside of 
the house was completely ruined. The only thing that can be 
salvaged is the foundation of the bouse. All of the existing 
construction on the inside of the house was destroyed. 
Response - This allegation is not correct. The entire 
structure did not collapse as stated. A personal inspection of 
the site was made by our Claims Representatives, outside 
Engineer, and contractors. 
0. Kent Rich, of Ad an son Engineering?, exaniner! the Crookston 
hone and determined that five out of the 12 sections of the 
outer shell needed to be replaced. 
#2 Allegation - Three estimates for reconstruction were 
submitted for S4S>,60G, 551,000, and $74,000. 
Pesnonse - It is correct that these bids were submitted, but 
this was prior to an analysis Leino done by Adamson 
Pngineering. All throe of the abov-2 indicated estimates 
included tsarinq down the entire structure and rebuilding. This 
APPENDIX L 
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is new style construction in the area and it was felt that an 
Engineer's opinion should fce obtained in order to adequately 
evaluate the danage. 
#3 Alienation - The insurance company stalled for a period of 
six months before paying the clain. 
Response - There was a six-month delay in the settlement of 
this claim. The delay was caused by the insured's attorney 
failing to cooperate in filling out the necessary proofs of 
loss. Our company also diligently worked in obtaining copies of 
the blue prints so that a proper estimate of the damage could be 
made. 
The blue prints v^re delivered to our Claims Representative by 
Mr. Klemm on April 30, 1982. The estimates obtained by Mr. 
Klemm were given to us on March 29,1932, March 31, 1982, and Mav 
20, 1982. 
While we agree tiiat there was a long delay in the settlement 
process, we do not feel that our personnel were responsible. 
#4 Mlegation - Farmers Insurance had its own Engineer examine 
the bids, and another estimate was obtained from a contractor 
using the previously submitted bids. 
Response - 0. Kent Rich is an independent contractor and a 
licensed Engineer in the State of Utah. His expertise was 
sought in order to properly evaluate the claim. Be was hired by 
Farmers Insurance to evaluate this one particular loss. 
The Phipps Construction Company bid of 527,000 was arrived at by 
Mr. Fhipps examining the blue prints and consulting with O. I^ ent 
Rich of Adamson Engineering. Mr. Phipps is in no way employed 
by Farmers Insurance Group. 
#5 Allegation - Lack of cooperation or communication by Farmers 
Insurance Group with Mr. Klemm. 
Response - ?*r. T*lenrn was c a l l e d on June 14, 1982, and on June 
15, 1902. JSessages were l e f t th ree t imes on the two separa te 
days but he did not r e t u r n these c a l l s . 
#6 fi. l i e ca t ion - i^gocia t ionr . were d i r e c t l y with thts i;cckv 
Ilcuiicam f t a t e Pank of Dourt i ful for $27,000. 
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Response - Negotiations were carried on with the Rocky 
Mountain State Bank for a total of $32,744. This settlement 
includes $27,744 damages plus $5,000 accrued interest. 
The interest payment was questionable because it occurred due to 
lack of cooperation from the insured. 
#7 Allegation - The insurance company misled Mr. Klemm and told 
him on tha day settlement was made that the claim was not ready 
to settle. 
Response - In addition to the three calls listed above, the 
Claims Representative again called Mr. Klemm after settlement 
had been concluded with the bank. The Claims Representative 
attempted to explain to Mr. Klemm the basis for the settlement, 
but Mr. Klemm became angry and stated he would file suit and 
hung up. There is no indication that Mr. Klemm contacted this 
office prior to the day the settlement was made. 
^8 Allegation - Farmers Insurance obtained a bid from a 
contractor who knew that he would not have to rebuild the home 
at the price he stated in his bid. It is further a doubt in Mr. 
Klemm1s mind that the contractor ever visited the home in 
question. It is further alleged by Mr. Klemm that the bid was 
obtained by our company with the idea of depriving the 
Crookstons of the benefits available under the policy. 
Response - These allegations are incorrect. Phipps 
Construction Company made an estimate to repair the actual 
damage based upon the Engineer's scope rather than to tear down 
and rebuild as the other three contractors suggested. Phipps 
Construction Company intended to do this job for the estimated 
amount and still feels the estimates are adecuate to make a 
substantial profit on this job. Mr. Phipps is willing to 
testify that he was on the construction site at least six 
different times, had two neetinns with Gyro Steel, Incorporated 
to obtain correct prices, spent at least 25 additional hours 
developing his estimate. 
Our Ogden Claims Office recontacted Mr. ^hipps on October 25, 
1932 and asked if he was willing to do the repairs at his 
estimated price. Mr. Phipps at that time indicated he felt it 
would still be profitable for him to do that job and was willing 
to do so for the estimated price. 
300030 
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I hope this letter adequately explains the actions taken by our 
conpany in attempting to settle this claim. I an enclosing 
portions of our file, including the Engineer1s report, bid fron 
Phipps Construction Company, and other documents which I feel 
are pertinent. 
If you have any further questions, please write me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Sam B. Olsen 
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HiroiH KLERKS OPPICS 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472) 
Attorney General 4tlG ?.1 f? T* PM • • 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN (#2891) ---•;. J. 
Chief
 r Assistant Attorney General •l|-[; . ...'0L£rtK 
BRYCE H. PETTEY (#2593) 5'. .'. . JU'.T 
Assistant Attorney General BY—'-^-ill-i. LLJL^Li 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. ,,-'"<^ V CL£3K 
Attorneys for George Sutton, 
Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions of the State of Utah 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5319 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AMD FOR 4&G» COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE : ORDER APPROVING POSSESSION 
POSSESSION OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN : /? r> ^ 7 C~ ~7r J ^> 
STATE BANK BY THE COMMISSIONER : Civil No. (S~JL-jJI-l~/JuL~5 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS : 
: Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This matter came before the Court §.& u&Lfce on the /yQ~~~ 
day of August, 1987, pursuant to the "Verified Petition for Order 
Approving Possession" of Rocky Mountain State Bank ("Bank") by 
George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the 
State of Utah ("Commissioner"). The Commissioner was represented 
by Bryce H. Pettey, Assistant Attorney General. 
It appearing to the Court that the Commissioner has, 
under Uiak^Code.AQn^ § 7-2-1(2) (Supp. 1 9 8 7 ) , found that: 
(1) The Bank has violated laws, rules and regulations 
governing the Bank, which in part constitutes grounds for taking 
possession under Ut&b-JCLaiaJklllL*. § 7-2-1(1) (b) (Supp. 1 9 8 7 ) ; and 
Exhibit "A" 
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(2) The Bank is conducting its business in an 
unauthorized or unsafe manner, and is engaging in conduct inju-
rious to its depositors and the public, which in part constitutes 
grounds for takiny possession under U.t&tl_£o<ie_&aai_ § 7-2-1(1) (c) 
(Supp. 1987); and 
(3) The Dank has been notified by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation ("F.D.I.C.•') , which is the Bank's primary 
account insurer, of F.D.I.C's intention to initiate proceedings 
to terminate such insurance, and the Bank is otherwise not in a 
sound and safe condition to transact its business, which in part 
constitutes grounds for taking possession under Utafc_C.odg._Ann.. 
i, 7-2-1(1) (d) (Supp. 1987); and 
(4) The Bank has failed to maintain a minimum amount 
of capital as required by the Department of Financial Institu-
tions ("Department11) and the F.D.I.C, which in part constitutes 
grounds for taking possession under Utak-Qod^-Ann^ § 7-2-1(1)(e) 
(Supp. 1987); and 
(5) The Bank has become or is about to become 
insolvent, which in part constitutes grounds for taking posses-
sion under U.taJlJ£&&£jkaai. S 7-2-1(1) (f) (Supp. 1987); and 
(6) The Bank has failed or refused to comply with the 
terms of a duly and legally authorized order issued by the Com-
missioner and by the F.D.I.C, which in part constitutes grounds 
for taking possession under Utah,Cpde...Appi. § 7-2-1(1) (g) (Supp. 
1987); and 
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(7) The remedies provided in Ut&llJ£&4£_4nrL±_ §§ 7-1-
307, -308, and -313 (Supp. 1987) are ineffective or impracticable 
to protect the interest of the Bank's depositors, creditors, and 
shareholders, which in part constitutes grounds for taking pos-
session under UtahiCode,Annt § 7-1-1(1)(k) (Supp. 1987); and 
It appearing to the Court that the purpose of this 
proceeding is to provide this Court with supervisory jurisdiction 
to review the actions of the Commission in accordance with, and 
pursuant to UtakJ^ Qd.e._AQxu. § 7-2-2 (Supp. 1987) ; and 
It appearing to the Court that all conditions required 
l^Y UtatLj^od^j^ao.^ § 7-2-1(2) (Supp. 1987) have been met for the 
Commissioner to take possession of the Bank; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions of the State of Utah, is authorized to take immedi-
ate possession of the Bank, and thereupon the Commissioner is 
vested, by this Order and by operation of law, with title to, and 
the right to possession of, the business, property, and all 
assets of the Bank. 
2. George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial 
Institution of the State of Utah, is authorized and directed to 
rehabilitate, reorganize, liquidate or give effect to the acqui-
sition of control of, the merger with, the acquisition of all or 
a portion of the assets of, or the assumption of all or a portion 
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of the liabilities of, the Bank in such manner as the Commission-
er determines to be in the best interest of the Bank's deposi-
tors, creditors, shareholders and other parties in interest, and 
to do all other things in connection therewith as may be autho-
rized by law. 
3. George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions of the State of Utah, is authorized to appoint a 
liquidator or receiver for the Bank if the Commissioner deems it 
appropriate to do so. 
4. All persons are ordered and directed to turn over 
immediately to the Commissioner any of the business, property or 
assets of the Bank in their possession. 
5. This Order shall operate as a stay of the 
commencement or continuation of: 
(a) Any judicial, administrative or other proceeding 
against the Bank, including service of process; 
(b) Enforcement of any judgement against the Bank; 
(c) Any act to obtain possession of property of or 
from the Bank; 
(d) Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien 
against property of the Bank; 
(e) Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim 
against the Bank; and 
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(f) The se tof f of any debt owning to the Bank aga ins t 
any claim a g a i n s t the Bank. 
DATED t h i s $J._ day of August, 1987. 
AT7KT 
H. DIXON rt'r:3l/%' 
Deputy CicifU 
ss 
oTATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, TKZ 'JNDERC'GN'ID. CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COUflT OF SALT LAKi fOU^TY, UTAH, 0 0 Hmfc"9Y 
CERTIFY THAT I r te , - K ^ C A L U AW1 I ?>l ^aOi.*3 13 
A TRUE AND TOLL C C * f CF AN OfciClr*^ D0C~-
K.IrNT ON FILE \H MY CrF.CE A3 SJOH v.LC FK 
WITKlsaG MY H***D M*S S£AL OF £>AID COURT 
THIS ^ y DAY CK^jjrtfotdA U i ^ 1 9 & J L 
H. DWON HINDLEV, CLERK ./~1S ~lh~ 
Mtfrtfr&Ji Ob-MUTY BY X . 
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FRANCIS M. WIKSTKOM (A3462) 
DANIEL W. HINDERT (A1497) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
in Supreme Court Case No. 870252 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNT* 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION 
OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK 
BY THE COMMISSIONER OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
ORDER 
C i v i l No. C 8 7 - 5 7 4 3 
J u d g e J . D e n n i s F r e d e r i c k 
* * * * * * * * 
Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion to Lift Stay, peti-
tioning this Court to lift the U.C.A. § 7-2-7 stay of litigation 
against Rocky Mountain State Bank for purposes of the appeal in 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 870252, having come before this Court 
for hearing on Friday, April 8, 1988; this Court having reviewed 
said motion and a supporting memorandum, having heard oral argu-
ment, and having taken the matter under advisement with a request 
for supplemental briefs to be submitted to this Court after the 
Utah Supreme Court reconsidered its consolidation of Case No. 
870252 and No. 880034; this Court having reviewed all 
APPENDIX O 
supplemental briefs and having taKen notice ot the Order of the 
Utah Supreme Court dated April 18, 1988 denying consolidation of 
Cases No. 870252 and No. 880034; and this Court having found that 
Fire Insurance Exchange has not shown cause why the U.C.A. 
§ 7-2-7 stay should be lifted; now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Fire Insurance Exchange's 
Motion to Lift Stay be and it is hereby denied. 
f 1 9 8 8 . ENTERED t h i s / f c J W y of n | / l 
Approved as to form: 
P H I L I F R. TISHLER, E s q . 
STEPHEN J . TRAYNER, E s q , 
CERTIFICATE OF bbRVlCK 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this 2 * ~ 
day of April, 1988, to: 
Attorneys for 
Fire Insurance Exchange 
Philip R. Fishier, Esq. 
Stephen J. Trayner, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for FDIC 
Peter W. Billings, Sr., Esq. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Attorneys for Crookstons 
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 




STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
August 18, 1988 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Chrisentensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
In the Matter of the Possession 
of Rocky Mountain State Bank by 




Fire Insurance Exchange Company, 
Appellant. 
No. 880223 
The appeal by Fire Insurance Exchange is this day dismissed 
on the Court's own motion, as it is not taken from a final 
appealable order. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
APPENDIX P 
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^DOCKET; NO. 
J . , BRIEF 
LAW OFFICES 
GLENN C. HANNI, P.C. 
HENRY E. HEATH 
PHILIP R. FISHLER 
ROGER H. BULLOCK 
ROBERT A. BURTON 
R. SCOTT WILLIAMS 
DENNIS M. ASTILL 
S. BAIRO MORGAN 
STUART H. SCHULTZ 
PAUL W. HESS 
PAUL M, BELNAP 
BARBARA L. MAW* 
MARK J. TAYLOR1 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER 
JOSEPH J. JOYCE 
BRADLEY W. BOWEN 
VICTORIA K. KIDMAN 
G. ERIC NIELSON1 
ROBERT L. JANICKI 
CLIFFORD J. PAYNE 
ELIZABETH L. WILLEY 
PETER H. CHRISTENSEN4 
H. BURT RINGWOOD 
1 ALSO MEMBER ARIZONA BAR 
1ALSO MEMBER CALIFORNIA BAR 
SALSO MEMBER IDAHO BAR 
4ALSO MEMBER OREGON BAR 
STRONG & H A N N I 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SIXTH FLOOR BOSTON BUILDING 
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H &A\\\ 
March 21, 1991 
HAND-DELIVERED 
TELEPHONE <80«) 532-7080 
TELEFAX (801) 596-1508 
GORDON R. STRONG 
(1909-1969) 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
MAR 2 2 1991 
RE: Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange 
Case No. 880034 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
the Crookstons, respondents in the above-captioned matter, hereby 
submit the following supplemental citation: 
REFERENCE IN BRIEF 
Point XI, pp. 89-100 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO 
ALLOW FIRE INSURANCE . ADEQUATE 
OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CITATION 
Gilmour v. Cumminqs. 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (1991) 
SUBJECT 
Utah Court of Appeals reversed granting of summary judgment by the 
Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick presiding, on the ground the trial court acted 
prematurely in ruling on motion in contravention of Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. 4-501(1)(b). Issue of premature granting of summary 
judgment not raised by plaintiff-appellant on appeal. 
48 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
March 21, 1991 
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Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
STRONG & HANNI 
SJT/af 
cc: L. Rich Humphreys 
Frank Roybal 
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